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INTRODUCTION 
Striving to create an atmosphere conducive to learning, public 
school teachers, administrators, and security guards sometimes use phys-
ical force to control disruptive students. How school officials use physi-
cal force matters because students have a right to be free from 
"unreasonable" seizures, as protected by the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 1 School officials generally use physical force 
in two ways: to gain immediate control over disruptive students or to 
corporally punish them. Determining the reasonableness of their actions 
is a complex, novel inquiry because courts have rarely applied the Fourth 
Amendment to school officials' use of physical force to control and pun-
ish students. 2 Instead, courts have rejected these claims under the Four-
teenth Amendment's substantive due process component, requiring 
I U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. For an analysis of how these claims may fall under the 
Fourth Amendment as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
see Kathryn R. Urbonya, Public School Official's Use of Physical Force as a Fourth Amend-
ment Seizure: Protecting Students from the Constitutional Chasm between the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 GEo. WASH. L. REv. I (2000). 
2 See Urbonya, supra note I, at 4-8. 
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students to prove a "shocking" use of force. 3 Few students are able to 
meet that difficult standard. How courts apply the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness standard in the future may thus result in more students 
bringing suits against school officials. 
The purpose of this article is to examine public school officials' use 
of physical force under the Fourth Amendment. Part I discusses how the 
United States Supreme Court has defined reasonableness when police 
officers use physical force to arrest suspects. These decisions underscore 
that assessing reasonableness requires consideration of all the circum-
stances confronting officials. Part II examines the unique context of the 
public schools by describing the Court's determination of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness with respect to searches by school officials. 
In New Jersey v. T.L.0.,4 the Court assessed the reasonableness of 
searching an individual student's purse and, in Vernonia School District 
471 v. Acton,5 the Court discussed the reasonableness of mandatory drug-
testing for student athletes. In both cases, the Court's reasonableness 
determination focused on the special context of public schools. 
Part III revisits the decision of Ingraham v. Wright,6 which sharply 
divided the Court even at the time it was decided in the 1970s. The 
majority held that public school officials need not provide students with 
process before hitting them for violating school rules.? In reaching its 
holding, the majority erroneously fused two types of force, force to con-
trol and force to punish, and assumed that striking public school students 
constituted effective discipline, a conclusion eroded by the Court's more 
modern personal security jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment. 
Ingraham failed to discern that hitting is a "punishment" that harms both 
the student and the learning environment. 
Part IV explores three significant aspects of the Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence as applied to the public schools. First, it dis-
tinguishes between the authority that public school officials have in edu-
cating students and the authority that parents possess in caring for 
children. School officials have only "custodial" and "tutelary" powers,8 
and any force used must further the schools' educational goals. In con-
trast, some parents use physical force to further their religious beliefs as 
3 See id. at 38-41 (examining the history and difficulty of students' substantive due 
process claims challenging school officials' use of physical force). 
4 469 u.s. 325 (1985). 
5 515 u.s. 646 (1995). 
6 430 u.s. 651 (1977). 
7 /d. The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment, U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII, which 
prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments," did not apply to students subjected 
to physical punishment by public school officials. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 659-71. 
8 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). 
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protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.9 
Second, the Supreme Court interprets reasonableness by considering the 
history of the right to personal security, both at common law and under 
modern practices. Third, this section describes the significant psycho-
logical differences between physical force to control and physical force 
to punish: physical force to punish may engender both psychological 
harm to students and a poor environment for learning. 
Part V then applies a reasonableness standard for public school offi-
cials' use of physical force in light of the Supreme Court's Fourth 
Amendment personal security decisions. It distinguishes sharply be-
tween school officials using force to regain order in the school and force 
used to punish. It contends that, even though the Fourth Amendment 
affords public school officials broad deference in their decisions to use 
physical force to control students, they have no discretion to use physical 
force as "punishment," in light of the Court's modern personal security 
decisions. The Fourth Amendment thus allows public school officials to 
act quickly to break up fighting, out-of-control students, but it also bars 
corporal punishment in the public schools. 
I. POLICE OFFICERS' USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Police officers, suspects, prosecutors, judges, and juries often disa-
gree as to what constitutes "reasonable" physical force in apprehending 
citizens. Such disagreements are inevitable because defining "reasona-
bleness" under the Fourth Amendment requires a case-by-case balancing 
of conflicting interests. 10 In addition, officers face so many different sit-
uations that reasonableness evades easy categorization. The Supreme 
Court attempted to create such a "category" in Tennessee v. Garner11 as 
it examined an officer's use of deadly force. However, in Graham v. 
Connor, 12 the Court declined to employ a categorical approach as to the 
use of non-deadly force. Both these cases reveal that context determines 
9 U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
10 See, e.g., Kenneth Adams, Measuring the Prevalence of Police Abuse of Force, in 
POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 52 (William 
A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) (rejecting the idea of concrete "facts" as to what constitutes 
"excessive" force, particularly as the definition of "excessive" changes over time). See also 
SAMUEL G. CHAPMAN, MuRDERED ON DuTY: THE KILLING oF PoucE OFFICERS IN AMERICA 
5-13 (1998) (describing police officers as "punching bags" because of the assaults inflicted by 
the public); JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABovE THE LAw: PoucE AND THE UsE OF 
ExcESSIVE FoRCE 23-42 (1993) (examining the conflict between the public and officers in 
assessing what constitutes reasonable force). See generally MICHAEL AvERY ET AL., PoucE 
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION§ 2.15, at 2-28 to 2-34 (2000) (collection Of cases exam-
ining Fourth Amendment reasonableness). 
II 471 U.S. I (1985). 
12 490 u.s. 386 (1989). 
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the level of deference given to police officers' judgments: the greater the 
harm inflicted on suspects, the less deference officers receive from 
courts, juries, and the public. 
In Garner, the Supreme Court examined the use of deadly force not 
just in light of common-law practices, 13 but also in light of evolving 
notions of what constitutes effective, sound policing. 14 At issue in Gar-
ner was an officer's intentional shooting of a fleeing suspect. 15 The of-
ficer had reason to believe that the suspect had committed a burglary but 
did not have any reason to believe that the suspect had harmed anyone. 16 
As the suspect fled over a fence, the officer shot him in the back.n Even 
though a state statute had authorized this kind of shooting, 18 the Court 
held that the shooting was "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amend-
ment.19 In so doing, the Court created a category for assessing reasona-
bleness: ·deadly force is reasonable when an officer has "probable cause 
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the 
officer or to others."20 
However, even in using this categorical approach, officers, courts, 
and juries have struggled to balance the interests of suspects and the pub-
lic. The Garner Court properly noted that suspects have a "fundamental 
interest"21 in life and that the reasonableness of taking suspects' lives 
thus depends on the threat to the lives of others. The problem has not 
been in recognizing the importance of bodily integrity on both sides of 
the scale, but rather in determining what actually happened and the de-
gree of danger, whether to officers or communities. 
In examining the question of danger, the Garner Court looked to 
contemporary notions of sound policing.22 It noted some movement 
away from the common-law rule that allowed shootings under broader 
circumstances.23 And even though a majority of states had not rejected 
the common-law rule, the Court determined that it should consider con-
temporary practices in determining reasonableness. 24 Specifically, the 
13 Garner, 471 U.S. at 12-15. 
14 /d. at 14-22. 
15 /d. at 7. 
16 /d. at 3-4. 
17 /d. at 4. 
18 /d. 4-5. 
19 /d. at 22 (stating that statute was "invalid insofar as it purported to give [the officer] 
the authority" to shoot a fleeing burglar). 
20 /d. at II. 
2 1 Jd.at9. 
22 /d. at 15-19. 
23 /d. 
24 The Court conceded, "[i]t cannot be said that there is a constant or overwhelming 
trend away from the common-law rule .... Nonetheless, the long-term movement has been 
away from the rule that deadly force may be used against any fleeing felon, and that remains 
the rule in less than half the States." /d. at 18. 
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Court referenced actual police department policies, stating that it "would 
hesitate to declare a police practice of long standing 'unreasonable' if 
doing so would severely hamper effective law enforcement."25 Relying 
upon documented research, the Court concluded that limiting the use of 
deadly force to its new category-"when suspects threaten the infliction 
of serious physical harm"-would not undermine effective law enforce-
ment goals.26 
By contrast, when police officers use non-deadly force, the Supreme 
Court applies a case-specific balancing test27 rather than its categorical 
approach when considering the reasonableness of the use of deadly force. 
Though noting that Fourth Amendment reasonableness "is not capable of 
precise definition or mechanical application,"28 the Graham Court did 
suggest three factors relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the use 
of non-deadly force to apprehend suspects: the severity of the offense 
committed, the danger presented to the officer and the community, and 
the nature of the suspect's attempt to resist arrest and flee. 29 Linking this 
case to Garner, the Court noted that, in considering whether the use of 
deadly or non-deadly force meets the Fourth Amendment's standard of 
reasonableness, courts must examine all circumstances. 30 
The Graham Court did limit this totality of circumstances test in 
three ways: (1) it rejected using the officers' motive to establish or ne-
gate reasonableness;3 1 (2) it advocated deference to officers' "split-sec-
ond judgments"32 under case-specific and emergent circumstances; and 
(3) it explained that, to be constitutionally unreasonable, the force used 
must consist of more than a simple "unnecessary push or shove."33 
!d. 
2 5 /d. at 19. 
26 /d. (quoting amicus brief of Police Foundation et al. at I 1): 
After extensive research and consideration, [they] have concluded that laws permit-
ting police officers to use deadly force to apprehend unarmed, non-violent fleeing 
felony suspects actually do not protect citizens or law enforcement officers, do not 
deter crime or alleviate problems caused by crime, and do not improve the crime-
fighting ability of law enforcement agencies. 
2 7 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). 
28 !d. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). 
29 /d. 
30 /d. (citing Garner, 47 I U.S. at 8-9, which stated that the question is "'whether the 
totality of circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of ... seizure'"). 
31 !d. at 397. Although the Court explicitly rejected malice as an element of a Fourth 
Amendment claim, it did not bar using malice to undermine officers' credibility as to what 
they claim actually happened. !d. at 399 n.J2 (stating that the factfinder may consider "evi-
dence that officer may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen" in assessing an officer's 
credibility). 
32 !d. at 396-97. 
33 /d. at 396 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 
(1973)). 
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The Court rejected motive analysis by declaring that, in the context 
of an officer's use of force in apprehending a suspect, reasonableness is 
an objective standard.34 Neither an injured suspect nor an officer may 
use motive to establish or disprove a Fourth Amendment violation: "An 
officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out 
of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good in-
tentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional."35 
Instead, reasonableness considers other circumstances. 36 
The Court also stressed that the use of physical force must be as-
sessed in light of what the "reasonable officer" would have done in the 
case-specific situation. 37 Warning against "20/20 hindsight, "38 the Court 
recognized that policing requires officers to make quick decisions and 
opined that "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for 
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judg-
ments" in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving" 
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation."39 It 
follows that, in assessing reasonableness, one must consider how much 
time an officer had before deciding to act. 
The third limitation on the totality of the circumstances test im-
pliedly distinguishes between constitutional violations and batteries cov-
ered under state tort law. As the Court has stated in other personal 
security litigation cases, the challenged actions must be sufficiently of-
fensive to rise to the level of a constitutional violation before an analysis 
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness will even be appropriate. Once 
officers' actions cross this threshold, then the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies, even if their actions also violated state law. For example, in 
Monroe v. Pape, the Court declared that the availability of a state-law 
remedy does not negate the presence of a constitutional violation.40 It 
further noted that the aim of constitutional tort litigation under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 is to hold state officials accountable for their constitutional viola-
tions because the state law may be "invidious," the state's remedy may 
be inadequate, or the remedy may be available only in theory.41 The 
Monroe Court also pointed out that, even when state officials act con-
34 /d. at 397. 
35 /d. 
36 /d. (indicating that objective reasonableness is to be determined "in light of the facts 
and circumstances confronting [the officers] without regard to their underlying motivation"). 
37 /d. at 396. 
38 /d. ("The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspec-
tive of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."). 
39 /d. at 396-97. 
40 365 u.s. 167, 183 (1961). 
41 /d. 
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trary to state law, their actions still fall within the purview of the statute 
designed to check abuses by state officials.42 
The Court's guidelines for determining reasonableness thus leave 
much room for debate as to what is unreasonable physical force under 
the Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, three themes link Garner and Gra-
ham: (1) a focus on the nature of the suspect's actions; (2) an understand-
ing that reasonableness is ultimately determined by examining the 
totality of circumstances; and (3) a recognition of reasonableness as an 
objective inquiry. 
II. REASONABLE SEARCHES BY PUBLIC SCHOOL OFFICIALS 
The Supreme Court has yet to subject the use of physical force by 
public school officials to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. However, be-
cause the Court has twice applied the Fourth Amendment's reasonable-
ness standard to searches in the public schools, its discussion of 
reasonableness in that context informs an approach to assessing the rea-
sonableness of the use of physical force by public school officials. In 
New Jersey v. T.L.0.,43 searching a student's purse was held to be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment and, in Vernonia School District 
47 J v. Acton, 44 drug-testing of student athletes similarly survived consti-
tutional scrutiny. Although the Court decided these cases ten years apart, 
T.L.O. in 1985 and Vernonia in 1995, both decisions emphasize the 
unique environment of public schools, i.e., that a Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness inquiry must consider public schools' mission-education. 45 
A. REASONABLE ScHOOL SEARCHEs: NEw JERSEY v. T.L.O. 
In 1985, for the first time, the Supreme Court faced the difficult task 
of delimiting public school officials' power to search a student's purse. 
In New Jersey v. T.L.0.46 the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry 
focused on one student-T.L.O., a fourteen-year old girl who allegedly 
violated a school rule against smoking in the bathroom.47 The facts of 
T.L.O. recount what could be a typical school day and help to explain 
why the Court sharply distinguishes between searches by school officials 
and searches by police officers looking for criminal violations. 
42 /d. at 172-87. 
43 469 u.s. 325 (1985). 
44 515 u.s. 646 (1995). 
45 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653-56; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-43. 
46 469 u.s. 325 (1985). 
47 /d. at 328. 
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1. Examining the Purse: The Facts of T.L.O. 
Under school rules, smoking at school was illegal, but possession of 
cigarettes was not.48 When a teacher "discovered" two girls smoking in 
the bathroom, she took the students to the vice-principal's office.49 
T.L.O.'s friend admitted to smoking in the bathroom, and T.L.O. denied 
it.50 According to the Court, the vice-principal then had reasonable sus-
picion that T.L.O. had violated the school's rule against smoking.51 He 
lawfully opened her purse (which the Court determined was the obvious 
place to find T.L.O.'s cigarettes)52 and saw a package of cigarettes.53 
When he grabbed the cigarettes, he saw a package of cigarette rolling 
papers, which he thought was related to marijuana use.54 Again accord-
ing to the Court, the official's "second" search was based on reasonable 
suspicion that T.L.O. had marijuana as well.55 This search revealed "a 
small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags,"56 
lots of one-dollar bills, and an index card listing names and entitled "peo-
ple who ·owe me money."57 The vice-principal then notified T.L.O.'s 
parents and the police.58 The school suspended T.L.O. for ten days -
three days for smoking and seven days for possesSing marijuana.59 
The state also held T.L.O. to be a delinquent under state law.60 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court later vacated on grounds that the search was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.61 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the issue presented was whether the exclusionary rule applied to 
juvenile delinquency proceedings,62 but the Court decided the case on a 
broader ground, holding that the vice-principal's searches did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.63 In short, the Court deemed the searches 
"reasonable."64 
48 /d. at 344. 
49 /d. at 328. 
50 /d. 
51 /d. at 345-46. 
52 !d. at 346. 
53 !d. at 328. 
54 /d. 
55 /d. at 347. 
56 /d. at 328. 
57 /d. at 347. 
58 /d. at 328. 
59 /d. at 329 n.l. 
60 /d. at 330. 
61 /d. at 330-31. 
62 !d. 
63 /d. at 347-48. 
64 /d. 
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2. Defining Reasonableness in School Searches: The Model of 
Terry v. Ohio 
In interpreting what constitutes Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
for searches in public schools, the Court drew upon its analysis in Terry 
v. Ohio,65 a case that established new boundaries for determining the 
reasonableness of police officers' stops and frisks. Under Terry, officers 
may forcibly detain a suspect if they have reasonable suspicion that the 
suspect is about to commit a crime, and they may frisk with reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect is "armed and dangerous."66 The T.L.O. Court 
quoted the open-ended language of Terry to describe the reasonableness 
standard for school searches: 
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a 
twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether the 
... action was justified at its inception"; second, one 
must determine whether the search as actually conducted 
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place."67 
Thus, the T.L. 0. Court held that, in determining the reasonableness of 
Fourth Amendment searches by public school officials, courts must con-
sider the suspicion underlying the search and the scope of the search in 
light of the basis for suspicion. 
Even though the Court applied the Terry doctrine, it hinted that it 
might later deviate from it. With the Terry decision requiring reasonable 
suspicion to justify a police officer's stop and frisk, the T.L. 0. Court left 
open the question of whether reasonable suspicion is always required 
before school officials may conduct "reasonable" school searches,68 an 
ambiguity that the Court later used in Vernonia School District 47J. v. 
Acton,69 to justify the reasonableness of drug-testing student athletes. 
Perhaps even more significant is that, unlike Terry stops, school of-
ficials need not have reasonable suspicion as to a violation of criminal 
65 392 U.S. I (1968). 
66 /d. at 30. Since Terry, the Court has extended this view of reasonableness to other 
contexts. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1990) (officers may conduct a 
"protective sweep" to inspect "those spaces where a person may be found" if they have "rea-
sonable suspicion" of danger during the execution of an arrest warrant); Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (officers may "frisk" the passenger compartment of a vehicle with 
reasonable suspicion that weapons are present during a valid traffic stop). The Court has at 
times also refused to expand Terry's definition of reasonableness. See, e.g .. Florida v. J.L., 
120 S.Ct. 1375, 1379-80 (2000) (refusing to create a "firearm" exception to Terry which 
would have allowed officers to frisk a person for weapons based on only an anonymous tip 
about illegal firearm possession); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373-74 (1993) (re-
fusing to allow officers to frisk a person based on reasonable suspicion of drug possession). 
67 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
68 /d. at 342 n.8. 
69 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
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law; mere reasonable suspicion that the student violated a school rule is 
sufficient to justify a reasonable search.7° In allowing searches for 
school violations, therefore, the Court gave school officials broader pow-
ers than those afforded police officers under the Terry doctrine, even 
admonishing courts that they should, "as a general matter," refrain from 
"distinguish[ing] between rules that are important to the preservation of 
order in the schools and rules that are not."71 The Court did not decide 
whether its new standard would apply to searches conducted in concert 
with police officers.72 
The standard announced in T.L.O. also differs from Terry with re-
gard to its analysis of the reasonable scope of the search. The search 
must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search."73 In a Terry 
context, this means that the scope of the search must relate to the need to 
disarm the suspect. 74 Yet, in the school context, the T.L. 0. Court specifi-
cally mentioned that school officials should consider the degree of intru-
sion "in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction,"75 thus creating a potentially more open-ended standard for 
assessing the scope of a reasonable school search than for a traditional 
Terry stop and frisk. 
3. Looking to the Purpose of the Search: Genesis of the 
"Special Needs" Doctrine 
In defining reasonableness, the Court in T.L.O. focused on the 
schools' need to control students and the special relationship between 
school officials and students. The Court's willingness to make the non-
law enforcement purpose of an intrusive activity a part of the reasonable-
ness calculus laid the foundation for the now well established "special 
needs" doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. 76 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Blackmun effectively described the "special needs" doctrine: 
"Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
70 !d. (characterizing the requisite reasonable suspicion as a reason to believe that stu-
dents violated either "the law or the rules of the school"). 
71 !d. at 342-43 n.9. 
72 !d. at 341 n.7. 
73 /d. at 342. 
74 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968). 
75 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
76 See e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23 (1997) (rejecting drug-testing re-
quirement for candidates running for state political offices); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646 (1995) (explicitly applying the "special needs" doctrine to drug-testing of ath-
letes. For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 86-141 and accompanying text); Nat'! 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664-65 (1989) (upholding drug-test-
ing of customs employees carrying weapons or involved with drug interdiction); Skinner v. 
Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (upholding drug-testing of railroad 
employees after major train accidents). 
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cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its bal-
ancing of interests for that of the Framers."77 
Thus, in T.L.O., the reasonableness inquiry focused on the adminis-
trative, "special needs" purpose of the search and, impliedly, whether 
school officials were acting more like police officers, parents, or some-
thing else. The vice-principal's purpose in searching the purse was the 
enforcement of school rules, presumably to ensure an effective, disci-
plined, learning environment and not to bring about the criminal prosecu-
tion of T.L.O. 
How the Court characterized the school official's capacity also re-
lated to the state-action question, i.e., whether school officials were even 
subject to the Fourth Amendment. In answering the state-action ques-
tion, the Court looked to Fourth Amendment decisions that involved 
searches done for regulatory, not criminal, purposes, such as searches by 
building inspectors, firefighters, and safety inspectors.78 Because the 
Fourth Amendment applied to these "regulatory" actors, school officials 
also were subject to the Fourth Amendment restraints - the need to act 
reasonably. The Court focused on the pedagogical mission of public 
schools and the need to define the constitutional relationship between 
school officials and students in light of that mission. In doing so, it re-
peatedly referred to the actual practices in public schools79 and stated 
77 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Biackmun, J., concurring). The T.L.O. majority did not 
clearly lay out this modem framework of the "special needs" doctrine, but it did effectively 
describe the groundwork for Justice Blackmun's explicit doctrinal category. The majority 
cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1976), a case that analyzed the "unique" 
context of "administrative searches" to uncover housing code violations. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 
337; Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. Camara explained that "administrative searches" at times may 
lead to the discovery of criminal violations, but their underlying purpose is not to serve crimi-
nal prosecutorial goals. !d. at 537 (stating that the inspections were not "aimed at the discov-
ery of evidence of a crime"). Camara redefined both "probable cause" for these 
"administrative" searches and the warrant requirement. /d. at 535-39. The kind of "probable 
cause" necessary for these searches did not "depend upon specific knowledge of the condition 
of a particular dwelling." /d. at 538. Instead officials could get warrants based on a "reasona-
ble legislative or administrative" scheme to select areas for inspections. !d. The Court has 
extended this type of "administrative search" to other "unique" contexts. See, e.g., New York 
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 695, 699 (1987). In Burger, police officers conducted "administrative 
searches" of "automobile junkyards" pursuant to a state statute that also gave them arrest 
powers. /d. at 694-95. The Court noted that "an administrative scheme may have the same 
ultimate purpose as the penal laws, even if its regulatory goals are narrower." /d. at 713. The 
Court discerned "plain administrative purposes" for the statute, rejecting that the inspections 
were pretextual acts to uncover criminal violations. /d. at 716 n.27. 
78 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978) (fire 
inspections); Marshal v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978) (occupational, health, 
and safety inspections); Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (housing code inspections)). 
79 /d. at 339 (stating that the "State's suggestion that children have no legitimate need to 
bring personal property into the schools [does not) seem well anchored in reality"). 
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that applying the doctrine of in loco parentis to school officials did not 
make sense in light of "contemporary reality."80 
With school officials acting neither as police officers nor surrogate 
parents, the Court had to decide how to measure reasonableness with 
regard to this new category of searchers. The majority rejected requiring 
probable cause and a warrant to conduct student searches because it 
viewed schools as needing "swift and informal disciplinary proce-
dures."81 Imposing a warrant requirement, the Court reasoned, would 
"frustrate"82 the legitimate, non-law enforcement purpose of the searches 
- creating a sound educational environment. In recognition of the "spe-
cial needs" of the schools, the T.L.O. Court opted instead for a pure bal-
ancing of interests, pitting "the schoolchild's legitimate expectations of 
privacy"83 against the "school's equally legitimate need to maintain an 
environment in which learning can take place."84 The Court then found 
80 /d. at 336-37 ("In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions, school offi-
cials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they 
cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment."). 
81 /d. at 340. 
82 /d. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33). 
83 /d. 
84 /d. One scholar has interpreted T.L.O. as "sending conflicting messages" in "its strug-
gle to come to grips with school power." Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitu-
tional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 49, 80 (1996). 
For Professor Dupre, the middle ground taken by the Court - school officials were not police 
officers nor parents-created mixed signals regarding the school's mission - "social recon-
struction" or "social reproduction." /d. at 64-69. In creating this dichotomy, Professor Dupre 
views a "social reconstruction" purpose for schools as requiring courts to give less discretion 
to school officials for their judgment, but to give them more if schools have a "social repro-
duction" purpose: 
In the social reconstruction model, the school is an institution where power is neces-
sary only to facilitate the child in his attempts to reconstruct a new social order .... 
The school as a force in reconstructing a new social order was a reverse of the 
traditional function of public education in American society, in which the power of 
the school was necessary to inculcate - to reproduce - society's traditions and 
habits .... In contrast to the social reproduction model, which would allow the 
school the power it needed to mold children in society's image, the social recon-
struction model would allow the student the power the student needs to avoid perpet-
uating society's flaws. 
/d. at 65. Professor Dupre viewed the T.L.O. Court as a moving away 'from the "social recon-
struction" model and toward the "social reproduction" model: "It was hard to keep an image of 
the pure school child leading society's reformation when the child keeps others from obtaining 
a serious education and begins to look like an oppressor himself." /d. at 81. 
Even though educators for decades have debated these contrasting models, id. at 65, in 
the context of examining the constitutional rights of students, the dichotomy is difficult to 
apply. Having students seek enforcement of their Fourth Amendment rights is consistent with 
both models - social reconstruction and social reproduction - because of our long history of 
respecting individual liberty, an interest that both furthers the individual and society. 
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discipline a weighty interest that tipped the Fourth Amendment balance 
in favor of the school officials in the T.L.O. case.85 
B. REASONABLENESS OF STUDENT DRUG-TESTING: VERNONIA 
By 1995, when the Court faced the question of suspicion-less drug-
testing of student athletes in Vernonia School District 471. v. Acton,86 it 
had firmly established the "special needs" doctrine; the Court had upheld 
suspicion-less drug-testing of railroad workers87 and customs officials.88 
Yet, when it decided Vernonia, the Supreme Court articulated a more 
prominent role for the common law in determining Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness, indicating that, in some situations, the common law 
should possibly be the sole source in determining "reasonableness."89 
However, as in T.L.O., the majority opinion also engaged in a general 
balancing of interests.9° Focusing on the nature of public schools,91 the 
majority ultimately upheld Vernonia's drug-testing policy as facially rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.92 But the case also produced a 
dissent that posited a dramatically different view of reasonableness93 as 
well as a concurring opinion advocating a strictly fact-specific holding.94 
1. The School District's Drug-Testing Policy: Facts of Vernonia 
The Vernonia School District in Oregon adopted a policy of drug-
testing student athletes after noticing that students were rude and had 
used profane language in class.95 Believing that athletes were "role mod-
els" for other students and leaders of the district's drug culture,96 the 
district prohibited students from participating in sports unless they first, 
with their parents' permission, signed a form consenting to urine 
testing.97 
85 T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 342 n.9 ("We have 'repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming 
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control the conduct in the schools."'). 
86 515 u.s. 646 (1995). 
87 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
88 Nat'! Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (as applied to 
officials carrying weapons and in drug interdiction). 
89 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53. 
90 /d. at 654-65. 
91 !d. at 655-57. 
92 /d. at 664-65. 
93 /d. at 666-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joining were Justices Stevens and Souter). 
94 /d. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating holding applies only to student athletes 
who voluntarily participate in team sports). 
95 /d. at 648-49 (1995). 
96 /d. at 649, 663. 
97 /d. at 650. 
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Under the plan, a laboratory examined the urine to detect the pres-
ence of "amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana."98 The athletes were 
tested at the beginning of their chosen sport's season and then each week 
thereafter, with school officials randomly selecting ten percent of the ath-
letes for further testing.99 School officials of the same sex monitored the 
giving of a sample: male officials viewed the backs of boys urinating, 
and females stood outside the stalls of the girls, listening for the sounds 
of urination. 100 Students were to inform school officials about the pre-
scription drugs they were taking. 101 Only school officials received the 
results of the tests; they did not give any information to the police. 102 If 
a test came back positive for drug use, the school administered a second 
test. 103 Upon a second positive test, school officials notified the athlete's 
parents. 104 School officials then gave athletes the option of weekly test-
ing for drug use or suspension from athletics. 105 
Acton, a seventh grade student, refused to sign the consent form. 106 
When school officials barred him from playing on the football team, his 
parents filed suit, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief that the 
urine-testing policy was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 107 The Supreme Court, relying on the factual findings of 
the district court, held that the testing was reasonable as a "special 
needs" search. 108 
2. Looking to the Common Law and Revisiting the "Special 
Needs" Doctrine 
The Vernonia decision created a special role for the common law in 
Fourth Amendment analysis. Although the Court had previously consid-
ered the common law in assessing the reasonableness of a police officer 
shooting a fleeing felon, 109 the Vernonia Court declared that the common 
law should be not just a mere consideration but potentially outcome de-
98 /d. 
99 /d. 
100 /d. 
101 /d. at 650, 660 (noting that this facial challenge to the district's drug-testing policy did 
not assume that students had to give medical information directly to school officials but rather 
that they may have done so confidentially by sealed envelope). 
102 /d. at 658. 
I 03 /d. at 651. 
104 /d. 
tos ld. If the school suspended an athlete who then tested positive again, another athletic 
suspension ensued. A "third offense [resulted] in suspension for the remainder of the current 
season and the next two athletic seasons." /d. 
106 /d. 
107 /d. 
108 /d. at 664-66. 
109 Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. I, 12-15 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see 
supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text. 
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terminative where a clear common-law rule exists. 110 It thus offered a 
new paradigm that some recent Supreme Court decisions also em-
brace.111 In contrast to the Court's prior focus on the warrant require-
ment, a majority of the Court now embraced "reasonableness" as the 
analytical starting point for Fourth Amendment claims, with the common 
law being the first area to explore in adjudicating reasonableness. 112 
Drawing upon the common law as a primary basis for Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness analysis is no easy task because, as the 
Vernonia dissent noted, 113 one can characterize common-law practices in 
a variety of ways. The Court noted that education began in the private 
sector, with school officials having the authority to act in the manner that 
I I o 515 U.S. at 652-53 (suggesting that the balancing test must apply "at least, in cases 
such as this, where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of 
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted"). 
III See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999). The Houghton 
Court articulated a two-part inquiry for determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness, citing 
Vernonia as a case where this new test was applied: 
[W]e inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure 
under the common law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields 
no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of 
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon 
an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
11 2 See Urbonya, supra note I, at II n.41 (describing the Court's shift from the warrant 
requirement to a general reasonableness inquiry). Prior to this decision, the Court had some-
times embraced the common-law view and sometimes rejected it. See, e.g., Houghton, 526 
U.S. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (denying the primacy of the common law as a test for 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (sug-
gesting a common-law rule on the search of dwellings to be authoritative); County of River-
side v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55,71 (1991) (argument between majority and dissent as to 
whether common-law rule on probable cause determinations should have been outcome deter-
minative); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 n.2 (1991) (looking to common law to 
explain the meaning of seizure); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. I, 12-13 (1985) (rejecting the 
common-law rule allowing the shooting of fleeing felons); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
598, 591 n.33. (1980) (rejecting the common law as to warrantless arrests in the home); United 
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,421-22 (1976) (applying the common-law rule as to warrant-
less arrests in a public place). 
113 515 U.S. at 681 n.l (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wisely commented 
that one may choose different levels of generality in describing the "common law": 
[T]he historical materials on what the Framers thought of official searches of chil-
dren, let alone of public school children (the concept of which did not exist at the 
time) are extremely scarce. Perhaps because of this, the Court does not itself offer 
an account of the original meaning, but rather resorts to the general proposition that 
children had fewer recognized rights at the time of the framing than they do today. 
But that proposition seems uniquely unhelpful in the present case, for although chil-
dren may have had fewer rights against the private schoolmaster at the time of the 
framing than they have against public school officials today, parents plainly had 
greater rights then than now. 
/d. (citation omitted). 
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parents would authorize. 114 However, because the T.L. 0. decision had 
already distinguished modern-day public school officials from private 
school teachers at common law, the common-law practice did not neatly 
answer the reasonableness question in the Vernonia case. 
The Court examined another aspect of the common law to deter-
mine reasonableness - how the common law characterized the relation-
ship between parents and children. 115 Under the common law, parents 
enjoyed virtually unfettered power to control their children 116 and, con-
trary to its analytical emphasis in the T.L. 0. case, 1 17 the Vernonia Court 
pointed to prior decisions recognizing that schoolteachers "for many pur-
poses" act in loco parentis 118 in concluding that school officials do not 
"exercise only parental power over their students." 119 By analogizing 
common-law parental power to modern-day school officials' authority to 
educate, the majority opinion stressed how few rights children had at 
common law and, by extension, argued that children in the public 
schools should perhaps have similarly limited rights not only with regard 
to searches under the Fourth Amendment but also as to free speech rights 
under the First Amendment and due process safeguards under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 12o 
However, despite its analysis of the common law, the Vernonia ma-
jority decided that, because no clear practice existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was framed, the Court should balance the interests impli-
cated, taking into account the "special needs" doctrine. 121 In balancing, 
the Court restated some of T.L.O.'s assumptions, but also added new 
glosses to the "special needs" doctrine. To determine whether 
Vernonia's drug-testing program was a reasonable "special needs" 
search, the Vernonia Court considered four factors: (1) "the nature of the 
[student's] privacy interest"; 122 (2) "the character of the intrusion"; 123 (3) 
"the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern ... and; [4] the 
efficacy of [the selected] means for meeting it." 124 
"Central" 125 to the Court's analysis of the student's privacy interest 
was the legal relationship between the student and the state. The Court 
emphasized that Acton was a child "committed to the temporary custody 
114 /d. at 654-55. 
115 /d. at 654-56. 
116 /d. at 654. 
I I 7 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
liS 515 U.S. at 655. 
119 !d. 
120 /d. at 656. 
12 1 Jd.at653. 
122 /d. at 654. 
l23 /d. at 658. 
124 /d. at 660. 
125 /d. at 654. 
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of the State as schoolmaster," 126 and it used this relationship to assign to 
the school more expansive disciplinary powers than it had been willing 
to recognize in T.L.O. while, at the same time, limiting the schools' re-
sponsibilities to protect and preserve students' constitutional rights. The 
majority opinion acknowledged school officials have "custodial and tute-
lary" powers, 127 and yet also that they have no duty to protect students 
from other students. 128 A student's privacy interest, the Court reasoned, 
must therefore be viewed in light of "what is appropriate for children in 
school"129 and the significant power that school officials must wield 130 
in order to carry out what is "appropriate" for students. Furthermore, the 
Court indicated that the specific circumstances of this case, drug-testing 
in the context of school athletics, gave rise to an even further diminished 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment because, according 
to the Court, "sports are not for the bashfu1." 131 Thus, in the Court's 
estimation, the first factor- Acton's privacy interest -was not particu-
larly weighty. 
The majority opinion also assigned little weight to Acton's side of 
the balance in considering the second factor, the character of the intru-
sion, for two reasons. First, the drug-testing policy did little more than 
mandate something Acton would have to do anyway, urinate in a public 
restroom. 132 Second, the school used the results only to decide whether 
students could participate in sports, not for aiding criminal prosecution or 
126 /d. 
127 /d. at 656. 
128 /d. at 655. This rejection of a duty to protect one student from harming another ap-
peared as only dicta in the decision, but the majority, with its emphasis on "custodial" power, 
probably sought to signal that a corresponding duty to protect did not arise. School officials 
throughout the United States had already encountered numerous lawsuits alleging such a duty 
after the Court decided DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 
U.S. 189 (1989). Though the DeShaney Court held that government officials did not have a 
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect a child from an abusive parent, id. at 197, lawsuits 
followed when litigants claimed that schools - public actors - "created" the harm that stu-
dents faced while in the school's custody. See, e.g., Linda E. Fisher, Anatomy of an Affirma-
tive Duty to Protect: 42 U.S.C. Section 1986, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 461, 468 (1999) 
(collection of critical commentary on DeShaney decision); Landra Ewing, Note, When Going 
to School Becomes an Act of Courage: Students Need Protection from Violence, 36 BRANDEIS 
J. FAM. L. 627, 630-33, 642-44 (1997) (citing these lawsuits and criticizing the Court's failure 
to comprehend the schools' custodial duties); see also Katherine Lush, Note, Expanding the 
Rights of Children in Public Schools, 26 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & Civ. CoNFINEMENT 95, 117-22, 
126 (2000) (rejecting DeShaney's narrow view and advocating a broader reading of students' 
rights in the public schools, including a "right to attend a safe school" in order to promote 
effective education). 
129 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656. 
130 /d. at 655-56. 
131 /d. at 657. 
l32 /d. at 658. 
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administering "internal disciplinary" policies, thereby minimizing the in-
trusion on Acton's already limited privacy rights. 133 
On the other side of the balance was the Court's third factor - the 
school's interest in dealing with drugs in sports. Although in its first 
drug-testing case, the Court labeled the government's interest in con-
ducting the tests "compelling,"134 the Vernonia Court declared that 
"compelling" really meant "important enough to justify [a] particular 
search."135 By interpreting "compelling" in this less restrictive manner, 
the Court easily determined that the three stated purposes of Vernonia's 
drug-testing program ("to prevent student athletes from using drugs, to 
protect their health and safety, and to provide drug users with assistance 
programs") 136 outweighed the students' Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest. 
In interpreting the fourth factor, the Court determined that the 
school district's drug-testing policy was an effective means of deterring 
drug use by athletes, one that not only helped them but other students as 
well; the athletes avoided the physical and psychological harm of drug 
use and other students were spared the classroom "disruption" caused by 
drug-using students. 137 The Court also explained that the means used by 
school officials need not be the least intrusive to further the school's 
interest in deterring drug use.l38 The Court stated that requiring school 
officials to have reasonable suspicion of drug use would undermine the 
relationship between school officials and students, 139 making officials 
adversaries and subjecting them to lawsuits challenging decisions to im-
pose drug-testing on particular students. 140 
On balance the Court thus held that drug-testing athletes under the 
particular "special needs" presented by the facts of the Vernonia case 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Even though Vernonia 
involved group suspicionless searches and T.L.O. involved searches di-
rected at a particular student, both decisions relied heavily upon the pre-
sumption of diminished constitutional protection for students and the 
characterization of schools as a place with "special needs" in deciding 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 
133 /d. 
134 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989). 
135 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. 
136 ld. at 650. 
137 /d. at 661-62. 
138 /d. at 663. 
139 /d. at 663-64. 
140 /d. The dissent noted that teachers necessarily play an adversarial role when determin-
ing whether students have violated other aspects of a school's conduct code and selecting 
appropriate disciplinary responses for these infractions. /d. at 677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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c. THE "SPECIAL NEEDS" DOCTRINE UNDER T.L.O. AND VERNONIA 
In balancing interests, the.majority opinions in Vernonia and T.L.O. 
examined both the common law and modern practices. In doing so, the 
Court created a new framework for Fourth Amendment analysis, the 
"special needs" doctrine, in an effort to further and support sound educa-
tional practices in the public schools. 141 
In each case, the Court discerned "special needs" justifying searches 
to further an important purpose other than criminal investigation that, 
according to the Court, school officials could not fulfill using the more 
stringent requirements of a warrant, probable cause, or as in Vernonia, 
even reasonable suspicion. T.L. 0. applied an "implicit" "special needs" 
doctrine but, by the time Vernonia came to the Court, the Court had 
already applied the doctrine in other similar contexts. Therefore, the ex-
plicit invocation of "special needs" analysis in Vernonia was hardly 
surprising. 
What was startling was the Supreme Court's re-characterization of 
the role of the common law in deciding reasonableness. 142 Had the com-
mon law revealed a "clear" practice as to the reasonableness of searching 
public school students, the Vernonia Court would have considered this a 
dispositive answer to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. 143 This analytical 
sea-change - the movement from considering the common law as only 
one factor in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to a potentially con-
trolling one - is a perplexing twist that has been criticized in subsequent 
opinions 144 and not always followed. 
In applying the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, the Su-
preme Court did not determine that common law was controlling; as ap-
plied, the common law offered only limited guidance in discerning the 
reasonableness of student drug-testing. 145 Nevertheless, the common 
141 Although historically fostering education has been left to local school boards, the 
Court may still influence school policies as necessary to interpret and enforce the Bill of 
Rights, of which the Fourth Amendment is a part. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(l Cranch) (1803); but see Andre R. Imbrogno, Corporal Punishment in America's Public 
Schools and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Case for Nonratification, 29 
J.L. & Eouc. 125, 143 (2000) (noting that even though the United States "remains one of the 
few industrialized nations which continues to permit corporal punishment in their public 
schools," local schools should decide whether to use this type of punishment). Imbrogno, 
however, did not mention the Fourth Amendment as a possible basis for students' personal 
security claims; he referred only to substantive due process and equal protection claims under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and cited the First Amendment as a novel basis. 
142 See supra notes 110-120 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra note Ill and accompanying text. 
144 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 311 n.3 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating "we have never restricted ourselves to a two-step Fourth Amendment approach 
wherein the privacy and governmental interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-cen-
tury common law 'yields no answer'"). 
145 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652. 
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law affected its "special needs" balancing analysis: the opinion relied on 
common-law practices to justify restricting students' Fourth Amendment 
rights and privacy rights. 146 Yet, in keeping with the Court's acknowl-
edgment that school officials have "tutelary" as well as "custodial" pow-
ers, any assessment of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
must consider what school officials "teach" students by their actions. 
Under the "special needs" doctrine, school officials must use their custo-
dial power only as a means to educate students. This focus on educa-
tional purpose is at the core of the "special needs" doctrine. 
III. PHYSICAL DISCIPLINE AND PROCESS FOR STUDENTS: 
INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT 
The unique educational requirements of public schools also figured 
strongly in the Court's infamous decision of Ingraham v. Wright. 147 
Even though Ingraham did not raise a Fourth Amendment claim chal-
lenging the school officials' use of corporal punishment, 148 the case nev-
ertheless reveals the Court's perspective on public schools and its 
reliance on 1970s educational philosophy. Because public educational 
practices have changed dramatically since the 1970s, school officials and 
courts should now reexamine Ingraham and consider students' interests 
in personal security as safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment. 
Ingraham involved a constitutional challenge to a Florida junior 
high school's policy of striking students for violating school rules. 149 
Even though teachers were to consult the principal before hitting unruly 
students, they often did not150 and, after two students received large 
bruises from repeated strikes with a wooden paddle, their parents filed 
suit. 151 The issues were narrow: whether a school's failure to provide 
students with process before corporally punishing them violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and whether the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and 
unusual punishments" clause 152 applied to the act of physical punishment 
in the public schools. 153 The majority's opinion resolved both issues by 
examining the historical and contemporary use of corporal punishment154 
and the Framer's intentions regarding the issue. 155 Ingraham held that 
146 See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text. 
147 430 u.s. 651 (1977). 
148 The students did not invoke the Fourth Amendment as a basis for the suit. /d. at 673 
n.42. Nor did the Court grant review of their claim under the substantive due process compo-
nent of the Fourteenth Amendment. /d. at 659 n.l2. 
149 430 U.S. 651, 655-57 (1977). 
150 !d. at 657. 
151 /d. at 653 n. I. 
152 U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. 
153 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653. 
154 /d. at 559-63, 674-78. 
155 /d. at 664-70, 672-74 (1977). 
418 CoRNELL JouRNAL OF LAw AND Pusuc Poucv [Vol. 10:397 
the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the school's substantive decision 
to hit students for punishment 156 and that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not require "pre-hitting" process. 157 In rejecting both claims, the Court 
nevertheless had much to say about school officials' authority over 
students. 
A. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: THE COMMON LAW MEETS 
MoDERN TIMES 
In analyzing corporal punishment in the public schools, the Ingra-
ham Court interpreted the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in light of 
its version of common-law history as well as contemporary standards. 
Drawing liberally on legal historian William Blackstone's Commentaries 
which "catalogued among the 'absolute rights of individuals' the right to 
security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and 
wounding," 158 the Court nonetheless distinguished the public school con-
text and recognized a teacher's authority to "corporal[ly] insult" a stu-
dent as "moderate correction." 159 Thus, the use of physical force did not 
offend Blackstone's maxim when it furthered a student's education. The 
Court also looked at the 1970s practice of corporal punishment in the 
classroom. 160 When the Court decided Ingraham, twenty-one states "au-
thorized the moderate use of corporal punishment in public schools" 161 
and, even though "[p ]rofessional and pubic opinion [was] sharply di-
vided on the practice, and [had] been for more than a century," 162 the 
Court discerned "no trend toward its elimination." 163 Further, in contrast 
to the common law, the Ingraham majority implicitly rejected the in loco 
parentis doctrine by holding that a teacher's authority in the classroom 
did not derive from parental authority, 164 and it noted that, even though 
one state required parental consent before striking students, such consent 
was not constitutionally required. 165 
156 /d. at 671. 
157 /d. at 683. 
158 /d. at 661 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *134). 
159 /d. (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120). 
160 The opinion did, however, note the "general abandonment" of the common-law prac-
tice of corporal punishment among prison populations and mentioned applying "'evolving 
standards of decency""to prisoners' personal security claims under the Eighth Amendment. 
/d. at 660, 668 n.36 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
161 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 663. 
162 /d. at 660-61. 
163 /d. at 661. 
164 !d. at 662 (stating that "the concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the 
view- more consonant with compulsory education laws- that the State itself may impose 
such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 'for the proper education of the child and 
for the maintenance of group discipline"') (citing I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAw oF ToRTS, 
§ 3.20, at 292 (1956)). 
165 /d. at 662 n.22. 
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B. THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM: APPLYING THE ELDRIDGE 
TEST 
After thus discarding the Eighth Amendment claim, the Court ap-
plied the classic three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge to de-
termine what process the Fourteenth Amendment requires before school 
officials may strike students: (1) the student's interest in personal secur-
ity; (2) the "risk of an erroneous deprivation" of personal security and 
"probable value" of the requested safeguard; and (3) the state's interests 
in not having the safeguard. 166 In assessing the first factor, the Court 
acknowledged students' "strong interest in procedural safeguards that 
minimize the risk of wrongful punishment" 167 but also observed that the 
common law only permitted students to sue where infliction of corporal 
punishment in the classroom was unjustified - "in light of its pur-
pose."H>s The Court carefu1ly sketched the contours of the common-law 
privilege that permitted the use of force for "moderate correction" in fur-
therance of education, 169 but rendered conduct outside of that privilege 
actionable under state tort law_17° With regard to the second factor, the 
Court determined the risk of error in disciplining students to be "insignif-
icant" because school officials directly observe the unruly students. 171 
Likening the physical disciplining of unruly students to the warrantless 
arrest of suspects by police officers, 172 the majority held that more pro-
cess was unnecessary because the open nature of the school system acts 
as a check on potential abuse and because, in any event, "there was a low 
incidence of abuse." 173 As a result, the second factor weighed in favor of 
the school's policy. 
The majority's evaluation of the final factor, the state's interest in 
denying process to students subject to corporal punishment, relied upon 
two key assumptions. First, the Court assumed that physical punishment 
was an effective disciplinary tool, one that school officials might forego 
if they had to provide process before hitting students. 174 Although the 
Court noted that many people would welcome the "elimination or curtail-
. ment of corporal punishment ... as a societal advance," 175 it viewed the 
states' physical punishment policies as "reaffirm[ing]" the common-law 
166 /d. at 675 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
167 !d. at 676. 
168 !d. at 675-76. 
169 !d. at 675. 
170 /d. at 676 n.45. 
171 !d. at 677-78. 
172 !d. at 679-80. 
173 /d. at 682. 
174 Id. at 680. 
175 !d. at 681. 
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practice of allowing corporal punishment. 176 Second, the Court assumed 
that teachers needed to corporally punish students quickly to be effec-
tive177 and that students' "anxiety" would increase if school officials 
delayed the imposition of punishment by "interposing procedural safe-
guards."178 In light of these assumptions, the Court determined that pre-
hitting process would be a "significant intrusion into an area of primary 
educational responsibility." 179 
C. INGRAHAM'S RATIONALE 
In deciding that the Fourteenth Amendment only required post-hit-
ting process for physically disciplined students, the Ingraham Court dis-
tinguished between two disciplinary remedies - hitting and 
suspensions. 180 Pre-deprivation process is generally preferred before of-
ficials may suspend students. 181 The differing constitutional treatment 
may be related to the Court's view of physical discipline: a quick slap 
may keep the student in school, under control and learning, while a sus-
pension results in ejection and loss of educational instruction. The In-
graham Court's bright-line rule of allowing physical punishment with 
only post-hitting process avoided burdening schools with the tedious and 
uncertain task of determining the appropriate amount of process justified 
by the degree of physical harm inflicted in a given instance, an approach 
whose "impracticability" the Court found "self-evident" and illustrative 
of "the hazards of ignoring the traditional solution of the common 
law." 182 In short, the Court examined historical and contemporaneous 
practices among the states in rejecting any protection for physically pun-
ished students under the Eighth Amendment and in deciding the scope of 
students' procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. However, the Ingraham decision did explicitly leave open the 
question of whether physical punishment may violate the substantive due 
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 183 In light of the 
Court's more recent personal security jurisprudence, such claims would 
fall under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 184 
176 /d. 
177 /d. at 681 (indicating that teachers disciplining students "sometimes require immediate 
effective action"). 
178 /d. at 681 n.51. 
179 /d. at 682. 
180 /d. at 678 n.46. 
181 /d. 
182 /d. at 682 n.55. 
183 /d. at 659 n.l2. 
184 See Urbonya, supra note I at 51-55. 
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IV. CONTEXTUAL BALANCING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
FORCE TO FURTHER SAFETY AND 
FORCE TO PUNISH 
Modern courts adjudicating students' Fourth Amendment personal 
security claims must draw upon the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment 
precedents examining police officers' use of physical force, (Tennessee 
v. Garner and Graham v. Connor), school officials' searches of students, 
(New Jersey v. T.L.O. and Vernonia School District 471 v. Acton), and 
the constitutionally mandated process owed to physically punished stu-
dents (Ingraham v. Wright). This article synthesizes these cases and con-
tends that the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is 
rooted in contextual balancing, with what constitutes Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness depending upon the particular educational practice at 
issue. 
Grappling with numerous scenarios in which police officers use 
physical force to control and subdue suspects, the nation's courts, not 
surprisingly, have reached conflicting results when examining similar 
facts. 185 Many of the of the same problems surface when analyzing 
school officials' use of physical force in the public schools. As dis-
cussed above, in defining Fourth Amendment reasonableness for the 
classroom, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence suggests many factors: the 
nature of school officials' authority over students; the role of history, 
including common-law practices and modern practices; educational the-
ory, which includes assessing harm to students and the learning environ-
ment as a result of using physical force; and the need to defer to school 
officials' decisions. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amend-
ment decisions suggests that the Constitution affords school officials 
broad deference in using physical force to maintain school safety, but 
that physical force to punish is per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
A. ScHOOL OFFICIALs' "CusTODIAL" AND "TuTELARY" AuTHORITY: 
DIFFERENT FROM PARENTAL AuTHORITY 
The Supreme Court's precedents distinguish between parental au-
thority to use physical force and school officials' authority in educating 
students. According to the Supreme Court, school officials have both 
"custodial" and "tutelary" powers. When school officials searched stu-
dents in both T.L.O. and Vernonia, the searches were to further the 
schools' mission - education. In these Fourth Amendment decisions, 
185 See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers, 
Society, and the Fourth Amendment Right to Personal Security, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
623, 648-73 (1995) (highlighting numerous differences in how courts determine whether po-
lice officers' use of force is reasonable). 
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the Court noted that schools officials have power exceeding the powers 
given to them under the doctrine of in loco parentis. The Court high-
lighted that compulsory education laws made the school officials func-
tion as state actors, not parents. As a result of exerting state, not 
parental, authority, school officials could not claim the "immunity" 186 
that parents had or act free from "constitutional restraints." 187 In addi-
tion, the Court in dicta stated, "parental approval of corporal punishment 
is not constitutionally required." 188 
Whether school officials have acted constitutionally reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment depends upon how the measures further 
the schools' educational goal. School officials have "custodial" power in 
order to educate students. Even though many states ask parents to sign 
consent forms regarding school activities, school officials still have au-
thority that differs from parents because of their status as state actors. 189 
186 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. 
187 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
188 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,662 n.22 (1977); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J 
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 681 n.l (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing footnote in 
Ingraham). 
189 Parents have frequently invoked religious beliefs to justify the use of corporal punish-
ment. See, e.g., PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE Roo: THE RELIGious RooTs PuNISHMENT AND 
THE PsYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT oF PHYSICAL ABusE 46-81 (1991). Greven explored the relig-
ious justifications that "fundamentalist protestants" have used when explaining the striking of 
their children. Parents often asserted a need to break the will of a child in order to save the 
child from "eternal punishment." /d. See also Christopher G. Ellison & Darren E. Sherkat, 
Conservative Protestantism and Support for Corporal Punishment, 58 AM. Soc. REv. 131, 131 
(1993). Ellison and Sherkat, who are professors of sociology, examined the normative support 
for corporal punishment and noted its relationship to parents' religious beliefs: 
[T]he disproportionate support for corporal punishment among Conservative Protes-
tants derives largely from the distinctive epistemological commitments implied by 
the doctrine of biblical "literalism," along with two related ideological orientations: 
(I) a view of human nature as sinful and prone to egoism, and (2) a heightened 
sensitivity to issues of sin and punishment. 
/d. Although they stated that what constitutes a "'literal' interpretation of the Bible remains 
hotly disputed," id. at 132, they use the term "Conservative Protestant" to refer to an individual 
who focuses on "the certainty and legitimacy of biblical truth," linked with "issues of authority 
and obedience." /d. They also noted that psychologist James Dobson, the founder of Focus on 
the Family, justifies the use of corporal punishment by relying on his "Conservative Protes-
tant" religious beliefs rather than his training as a psychologist in determining what constitutes 
"good discipline." /d. 
Other sociologists have described this religious view in support of corporal punishment as 
"sacralized" violence, aimed at "fostering the child's well being in this world, and, ultimately, 
the next." Christopher G. Ellison & John P. Bartkowski, Religion and the Legitimation of 
Violence: Conservative Protestantism and Corporal Punishment, in THE WEB OF VIOLENCE: 
FROM INTERPERSONAL TO GLOBAL 48 (Jennifer Turpin & Lester R. Kurtz eds., 1997). These 
sociologists effectively described how such religious beliefs are not in any sense linked to a 
"true" interpretation of biblical truth, but rather tied to a particular religious institution's be-
liefs, which its members then adopt: 
Although many conservative Protestants would disagree, many observers argue that 
the Bible, like any text, contains passages that permit multiple readings. Thus, it is 
important to note that understandings of scripture -"inerrant" or otherwise - do 
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Yet, school officials who have signed parental consent forms in hand 
would naturally contend that a parent's consent to physically discipline 
the child would make the use of force per se reasonable. 190 Such an 
argument is not frivolous, but it nevertheless would miss the essence of 
the Court's decisions - school officials are state actors. 191 The Court 
assigned this constitutional status to school officials performing the pub-
lic function of teaching for an important reason: school officials must be 
free to fulfill the state law's command to educate youth. 192 When stu-
not emerge in a mechanical fashion from the solitary study and reflection of individ-
uals .... Rather, scriptural readings are social products, generated and disseminated 
within interpretive communities. Members of interpretive communities make certain 
a priori assumptions about a given text, and they adopt certain ground rules to define 
the boundaries of acceptable practice. These assumptions and conventions shape 
their subsequent readings of concrete passages, ruling out alternative understandings. 
/d. at 49. 
190 Many scholars, however, have reexamined how we discuss the relationship between 
children and parents. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: 
Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1379 (1994) (advocating 
that courts "dispense with the notion of parental rights altogether"). Professor Dwyer argued 
that child-rearing matters should focus on the interests of children: 
Abrogating parents' rights would, however, substantially alter the way that courts 
analyze conflicts between parents and the larger community over child-rearing. 
Rather than balancing parents' rights against state interests in the care and education 
of children, as presently occurs, judges would decide these conflicts solely on the 
basis of children's welfare interests. Doing so would be likely, in tum, to alter the 
precise limits of parental freedom and authority and to shift the boundary between 
permissible and impermissible state interventions. 
/d. at 1376. Professor Orentlicher has also advocated for a "child's" perspective, stating that 
we have mistakenly afforded parents the opportunity to strike children because "we view cor-
poral punishment from the perspective of parents" by "undervalu[ing] children and 
overvalu[ing] pain." David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Chil-
dren by Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 HousTON L. REv. 147, 185 
(1998). In addition, Professor Bitensky has advocated that state laws should no longer recog-
nize a privilege for parents to strike their children as a form of "discipline." Bitensky, infra 
note 197, at 360. She noted that the United States is one of the few nations to still allow this 
inhumane practice. !d. at 361. 
191 See, e.g., Joan L. Neisser, School Officials: Parents or Protectors? The Contribution 
of a Feminist Perspective, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1507, 1510 (1993) (rejecting the doctrine of in 
loco parentis as applied to teachers). Professor Neisser revealed an important problem if one 
were to view public school teachers as acting as parents: they would be able to physically 
punish students, asserting the parents' privilege at common law, but have no current duty to 
protect students in their custody. !d. For her, viewing teachers as parents would be adopting 
an "outmoded" "partriarchal model of the family." /d. 
192 See, e.g., Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and the Dis-
abled Student, 75 WASH. L. REv. I, 77 (2000) (rejecting the notion of public school teachers 
acting as parents because of their duty to consider the good of all students, not what is good for 
a particular child as would a parent). In examining the difficult question of how public school 
teachers may legally discipline disabled students in light of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1997), Professor Dupre described the 
possible and common conflict between parents and public school teachers: 
[T]he parent of a disabled child is interested in the welfare of his or her child, not 
that of the many other students in the community of learning. Professor Stephen 
Gillers, in describing wnat he calls "liberal parentalism," states that parental control 
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dents enroll in public, as opposed to private, schools, the state guides the 
actions of these school officials. 193 Parents are free to enroll their chil-
dren in private schools or even to "home school" them. 194 In the public 
school, due process requirements apply; they do not in private schools. 
The unique context of the public schools, in which officials exercise 
neither criminal law enforcement powers nor parental powers but rather 
"custodial" and "tutelary" powers, 195 thus complicates the Fourth 
Amendment analysis of reasonableness. The reasonableness of physical 
force becomes intertwined with the school's power to exercise limited 
custody and requires an "objective" 196 examination of whether the force 
used was reasonable under the particularized circumstances confronting a 
over a child's education is "presumed superior" because "the fallible human agents 
through whom government must act are less likely to do what is good for other 
people's children than fallible individual parents are to do what is good for their 
own." But even if a particular request is in the best interest of one particular child, it 
may not be in the best interest of other students and their parents, who do not have a 
voice in the matter .... To quote Justice Douglas, "It is the future of the student, 
not the future of the parents, that is of primary importance." 
/d. at 77-78 (citations omitted). She thus viewed teachers as the state's, not parents', agents in 
making educational decisions for the class. 
193 See, e.g., WILLIAM W. CuTLER III, PARENTS AND ScHoOLS 206-07 (2000) (detailing 
the historical conflicts between public school teachers and parents and advocating that teachers 
and parents work together). Cutler described this authority battle: 
Parents may not be the teacher's natural enemy, but they are usually unwelcome in 
the classroom. Armed with profession certificates and advanced degrees, educators 
believe that they have the authority to manage parental inquiries and even dismiss 
complaints about the judgments they make or the methods they use. Such autonomy 
carries a high price, justifying parental ignorance, apathy, and detachment. 
/d. at 2. Cutler asserted that public schools would function better if parents and teachers 
recognized a "symbiotic relationship" with the interest of children placed first. /d. at 2, 
199-207. 
194 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. KucKA, THE RIGHT TO HoME ScHooL: A GuiDE TO THE 
LAW ON PARENTS' RIGHTS IN EDUCATION 2 (2d ed. 1998). Klicka noted that when states first 
established compulsory public education, "home-schooling virtually died out." /d. He dis-
cerned the re-birth of home-schooling in the 1980s, noting two primary reasons: the parents' 
Christian religious beliefs and their dissatisfaction with the "academic and moral decline in the 
public schools." /d. at 2-3. The author, clearly in favor of home schooling, discussed the turf 
battle between public educators and parents. At one point, he quoted a public school teacher 
who referred to home-schooling as "a form of child-abuse" because of the social isolation 
home-schooled children experience. /d. at 24. He maintained that this "opposition" "seeks to 
regulate home schooling out of existence or at least into conformity" through excessive state 
regulation. /d. at 26-27. See also Louis FISCHER, DAviD SCHIMMEL, & CYNTHIA KELLY, 
TEACHERS AND THE LAw 434 (1999) (noting that all states allow parents to school their chil-
dren at home if they meet the "requirements of their particular state"); see generally Dupre, 
supra note 192, at 85 (noting that many parents chose private schools because of discipline 
problems in the public schools). 
195 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-56. 
196 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (I 989) (stating that "the question is 
whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circum-
stances confronting them"). 
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given school official and whether it furthered the purpose for which it 
was used. 
B. LEGAL AND EDucATIONAL PRACTICES AT CoMMON LAw AND 
TODAY 
In making this objective assessment, the Supreme Court's opinions, 
both in the policing and school contexts, suggest that courts must con-
sider past and present legal and educational practices. The Court finds 
the common law's conception of reasonableness informative, though 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness cannot be entirely equated with his-
torical common-law practices because common-law principles necessa-
rily fail to reflect the present-day realities of policing and education. In 
crafting its reasonableness jurisprudence, the Court therefore also consid-
ers modem practices, deferring in part to the judgments of the experts in 
particular areas. 
The common law provided little protection for the personal security 
of children, whether at home or in school. As numerous scholars have 
noted, historically both children and women were chatteP97 - the prop-
erty of the father and husband, who could beat them almost to death. 198 
Private tutors at common law had the authority to use physical force for 
"moderate correction," 199 but "unjustifiable" force was actionable be-
cause it exceeded the teacher's privilege.20° Contemporary educational 
and legal practices also shape the Fourth Amendment standard of reason-
ableness. When the Court decided Ingraham v. Wright in 1977, women 
197 See, e.g., RoBERT WHEELER LANE, BEYOND THE ScHOOLHOUSE GATE: FREE SPEECH 
AND THE INCULCATION OF VALVES 18 (1995) (stating that "[f]rom 1870 to 1920, a parens 
patriae doctrine, giving legal authority to the state to control and supervise children, displaced 
their chattel legal status"). Lane discerned that there was "a transfer of broad discretionary 
power to the state," in light of new state restrictions -"compulsory-education laws," limits on 
"child labor," and the "creation of a juvenile justice system." /d. In short, "children became, 
in effect, a newly regulated industry." /d.; Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our 
Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 439 (1998) (stating that "[c]orporal punishment of children, which 
dates back to antiquity, reflects children's continued classification as parental property"); Su-
san D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors in Litigated 
Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2075, 2076 (1996) (stating that "[a]t one 
time, children in the United States were regarded simply as chattel of their parents, or, more 
accurately, of their fathers"; adding that the "law relating to children focused not on their 
rights, but on the rights of adults with respect to their children"). 
198 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Civil Rights Reform in Historical Perspective: Regulating 
Marital Privacy, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 29, 31 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 
1998) (describing the husband's authority to ."restrain" his wife through "domestic chastise-
ment" in much the "same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or chil-
dren"). See also RoBIN WEST, CARING FoR JusTICE 132-38 (1997) (describing the use of 
patriarchal violence as a means of controlling women). 
199 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I 
COMMENTARIES *134). 
200 /d. 
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were gradually becoming legally autonomous individuals - retaining 
both their property201 and names after marriage,202 working in a variety 
of professions,203 and paying alimony when necessary.204 But society 
did not afford a similar autonomy to children; parents continued to con-
trol many important decisions.205 
Thus, when the Ingraham Court looked at "modern" practices of 
corporal punishment in schools, the 1970s legal landscape still reflected 
the historical pattern of diminished personal security interests for chil-
dren.206 The Court canvassed the states' corporal punishment policies in 
analyzing whether the Fourteenth Amendment required pre-hitting 
procedures: 
Of the 23 States that have addressed the problem 
through legislation, 21 have authorized the moderate use 
of corporal punishment in public schools. Of these 
201 See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a stat-
ute that allowed husbands to dispose of mutually owned property without their wives' 
consent). 
202 See, e.g., Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 
L. & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY & PRACTICE 91, 96 n.9 ( 1985) (stating that in the 1970s COUrtS 
finally recognized "the right of women to chose their own names"). 
203 See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing that federal law drawing different presumptions of dependencies for male and female 
spouses violated equal protection). In Frontiero, Justice Brennan discussed our nation's his-
tory of sex discrimination, stating society had justified this discrimination by its notion of 
'"romantic paternalism,' which ... put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." !d. at 684. 
As an example of this cage, he looked to the 1873 case of Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. ( 16 Wall.) 
130 (1873), which denied women the right to practice law by relying on stereotypes and relig-
ious perspectives to justify discrimination: 
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper ti-
midity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of 
the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is 
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the 
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of wo-
manhood .... 
. . . [The] paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. 
/d. (quoting Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141). 
204 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a state law that 
required only men, not women, to provide alimony). 
205 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R. et al., 442 U.S. 584, 616 (1979) (rejecting a facial procedural 
due process challenge to a state statute permitting parents to admit children to mental health 
hospitals, subject to evaluation by professionals). But cf id. at 625 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(stating that "it ignores reality to assume blindly that parents act in their children's best inter-
ests when making commitment decisions and when waiving their children's due process 
rights"). 
206 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child": Meyer and Pierce and 
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, I 002 (1992) (arguing that "our attach-
ment to [a] property-based notion of the private child cuts off a more fruitful consideration of 
the rights of all children to safety, nurture, and stability, to a voice, and to membership in the 
national family"). 
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States only a few have elaborated on the common-law 
test of reasonableness, typically providing for approval 
or notification of the child's parents, or for infliction of 
punishment by the principal or in the presence of an 
adult witness. Only two States, Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, have prohibited all corporal punishment in their 
public schools. Where the legislatures have not acted, 
the state courts have uniformly preserved the common-
law rule permitting teachers to use reasonable force in 
disciplining children in their charge.207 
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In short, the Court found "contemporary approval of reasonable corporal 
punishment,"208 and "discern[ed] no trend toward its elimination."209 
However, a survey of the same state laws today would reveal quite 
different results. In contrast to the 1970s, when twenty-one states au-
thorized teachers to physically punish students, today only two states di-
rectly grant school officials the authority to use bodily punishment.210 
Another state requires parents or guardians to consent before the striking 
of their children is permitted. 21 1 And, in a dramatic reversal, nineteen 
states and the charter schools in the District of Columbia now expressly 
forbid corporal punishment. 212 
Such statutes are analogous to the regulations of at least thirty-four 
states that ban foster parents from administering corporal punishment 
under any circumstances213 and provide further support for the notion 
207 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1977). 
208 !d. at 663. 
209 !d. at 661. 
210 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 844 (West 1998) (law does not prohibit a "parent, teacher 
or other person from using ordinary force as a means of discipline, including but not limited to 
spanking, switching or paddling"); TENN. CooE ANN. § 49-6-64103 (1996) (permitting any 
teacher or principal to use corporal punishment in a reasonable manner to maintain discipline 
and order). 
211 UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 53A-ll-802 (1997). 
212 ALASKA ADMIN. CooE tit. 4, § 07.010(c) (1998); CAL. Eouc. CooE § 49001 (West 
1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 302A-1141 (1999); ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/24-24, 5/34-84a 
(West 1998); IowA CooE ANN. § 280.21 (West 1999); Mo. CoDE ANN., Eouc. § 7-306(a) 
(1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71, § 37G (1996); MICH. CaMP. LAws ANN.§ 380.1312 (West 
1997); MINN. STAT.§ 121A.58 (1999 Supp.); MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 20-4-302(3) (1999); NEB. 
REv. STAT. 79-295 (1996); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN .. § 392.465 (Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18A:6-l (West 1999); OR. REv. STAT.§ 339.250 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 116la(c) 
(West 2000); VA. CooE ANN. § 22.1-279.1 (Michie 1997); WAsH. REv. CooE ANN. 
§ 28A.l50.300 (West 1997); W.VA. CoDE§ 18A-5-l(d) (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 188.31 
(West Supp. 1998); D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 31-2817(f) (1998). 
213 ARIZ. ADMIN. CoDE R6-5-5909E.4(e), (h) (2001) (stating "[n]o child ... shall be 
subjected to ... corporal punishment inflicted in any manner upon the body"; also banning 
"[p]unishment connected with functions of living, such as sleeping or eating"); Ark. Dep't 
Human Services Reg., Standards for Approval of Family Foster Homes § 139(c)((5) (a), (b), 
(c), (e), (f) (1999) (stating that "[p]hysical punishment inflicted in any manner" is unaccept-
able; banning "washing mouth out with soap, taping or obstructing a child's mouth, placing 
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painful or unpleasant tasting substances in mouth, on lips," "hitting, pinching, pulling hair, 
slapping, kicking twisting arm, forced fixed body positions ... "; also prohibiting "[d]enial of 
meals, clothing, shelter" and "[a]ssignment of extremely strenuous exercise or work" and 
"[l]ocked in isolation of any kind"); CAL. CooE REGS. tit. 22, § 87072 (a)(3), (6) (2001) (stat-
ing that "[e]ach child [has a] personal right[] ... to be free from corporal or unusual punish-
ment," and "[n]ot to be locked in any room, building, or facility premises by day or night"); 12 
Cow. CoDE REGS. § 2509-6 (1998) (stating that "[t]he caregiver must not use ... corporal or 
other harsh punishment, including but not limited to pinching, shaking, spanking, punching, 
biting, kicking, rough handling, hair pulling, or any humiliating or frightening method of disci-
pline"); CoNN. AGENCIES REGs. § 17a-150-109 (c) (2001) (stating that "[f]oster ... parents 
shall not use . . . corporal punishment, including but not limited to spanking, cursing, or 
threats"); FLA. ADMIN. CooE ANN. r. 65C-13.010.5.(e), (f), (h), (I) (2001) (stating that "substi-
tute care parents must not use corporal punishment of any kind"; also banning the punishments 
of "us[ing] soap to wash out the mouth, eating hot sauces or peppers, placing in hot water, 
kneeling on stones ... "; also prohibited are withholding "meals, clothing, or shelter as a form 
of punishment" as well as assigning chores that "involve physical exercise so excessive as to 
endanger the child's health, or so extensive as to impinge on time set aside for school work, 
sleeping, or eating"); GA. CoMP. R. & REGs. r. 290-2-5-.14(b)(2), (3), (4), (9) (2000) (stating 
that "corporal punishment" "shall not be used"; also banning as punishment the "[d]enial of 
meals or hydration," "sleep," and "shelter, clothing, or essential personal needs"); HAw. Ao-
MIN. RuLEs § 17-890-25(a) (1999) (stating that "[n]o child shall be subjected to physical pun-
ishment or any action which would endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being"); 
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402.2l(c), (d), (f), (g), (h) (2001) (stating that "[n]o child shall be 
subjected to corporal punishment"; adding that "[r]easonable physical force may be used to 
restrain a child in order to prevent injury to the child, injury to others, the destruction of 
property, or extremely disruptive behavior"; also banning as punishment depriving a child of a 
meal, clothing, shelter, or sleep; allowing restriction to an unlocked bedroom as punishment if 
for a "reasonable period of time"); IowA ADMIN. CooE r. 441-113.18(2) (2001) (stating that 
the "[u]se of corporal punishment is prohibited"; allowing "reasonable physical force ... to 
prevent injury to the child, injury to others, the destruction of property, or extremely disruptive 
behavior"); KAN. ADMIN. REGs. 28-4-314 (f) (1-3) (2000) (stating that "foster parent ... shall 
not use ... physical punishment, including hitting with the hand or any object, yanking arms 
or pulling hair"; also "restricting movement by tying or binding" and banning "[c]onfining a 
child in a closet, box, or locked area"); LA. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 48, § 1.6109(0)(9)(c)(ii), (v-vii) 
( 1999) (stating that "[f]oster parent[] shall not use ... corporal punishment"; also banning as 
punishments "[p]hysically strenuous exercise or harsh work," "[i]solation in a locked room or 
any closet or other enclosed space," and "[i]solation in an unlocked room for more than one 
hour"); CooE ME. R. § 10 148 016(9)(0)(2)(b)(d), (3)(b) (1998) (stating that "[i]n no instance 
shall a child be subjected to ... [p]hysical punishment, kneeling, shaking, spanking, or striking 
with an object or a blow with the hand"; also prohibiting as punishment the "[d]eprivation of 
meals" but allowing for "[p]hysical restraint ... when necessary to protect the child from 
inflicting injury to themselves or others"); Mo. REGS. CooE tit. 07 § 02.25.19(0)( 1-3), (6), (8-
1 0) (2001) (stating that foster parents shall not use "[c]orporal punishment, which includes 
physical hitting or any type of physical punishment inflicted in any manner upon the body"; 
also banning as punishments the following: "[p]hysical exercises, such as running laps or per-
forming pushups"; "[r]equiring or using force to require a child to take an uncomfortable 
position such as squatting, bending, or repeated physical movements"; "[d]enial of meals, 
clothing, bedding, sleep"; "[b]odily shaking"; "[p]lacement in a locked room"; and "[u]se of 
mechanical or chemical restraints"); MAss. REGs. CooE tit. 110, § 7.111(2) (2001) (stating 
that foster parents must sign a written agreement prohibiting "any form of corporal punish-
ment"); MINN. R. 9545.0160 (2000)(0), (F),(I) (prohibiting corporal punishment, which "in-
cludes but is not limited to hitting, slapping, spanking, pinching, shaking, kicking, or biting"; 
prohibiting the deprivation of "meals" as discipline and "[i]solation" "in a closet or locked 
room"); M1ss. REG. 11-111-003, vol. IV (C)(I-2), Placement Services (1994) (stating that 
"[f]oster parents shall not use corporal punishment" and also barring the "withholding of food" 
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as punishment); Mo. CoDE REGS. ANN. tit. 13, § 40-60.050(5)(A) (2001) (stating that "[f]oster 
parents shall not use corporal punishment"); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. 474-6-003.33G(2)(a-d) 
(1999) (stating that foster parents shall never use as discipline the following: "[p]hysical pun-
ishment," "[d]enial of necessities," [c]hemical or mechanical restraints" or "threats of physical 
punishment"); N.J. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 10, § 122C-1.13(b) (2001) (stating that "[t]he foster par-
ent shall not use corporal punishment"); N.M. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 8, § 27.3.25.1.5 (2001) (pro-
viding that "[p]rohibited forms of discipline include, but are not limited to the following: 
corporal punishment such as shaking, spanking, hitting, whipping, or hair or ear pulling; pro-
longed isolation; forced exercise; denial of food, [and] sleep"; also prohibiting locking a child 
"in a room or closet"); N.D. ADMIN. CoDE§ 75-03-14-05(7)(a) (1999) (stating that "[n]o child 
may be punched, spanked, shaken, pinched, roughly handled, or struck with an inanimate 
object;" allowing as discipline "gentle physical restraint such as holding"); OHIO ADMIN. CoDE 
§ 5101:2-7-09(E)(l-3), (6), (8-9), (F), (H) (2001) (stating that a "foster caregiver shall not use 
... [p]hysical hitting or any type of physical punishment inflicted in any manner upon the 
body such as spanking, paddling, punching, shaking, biting, hair pulling, pinching, or rough 
handling"; also banning a punishment "[p]hysically strenuous work or exercises"; requiring 
"child to take an uncomfortable position, such as squatting or bending, or requiring a foster 
child to repeat physical movements when used as a means of punishment"; depriving child of 
meals, sleep, "shelter, clothing, bedding, or restroom facilities"; but allowing physical restraint 
only by caregivers who have received "specific training" and who use the "least restrictive 
physical restraint necessary to control a situation"); OKLA. ADMIN. CoDE§ 340:75-17-2(b)(4); 
§ 377:10-7-3(13)(A), (D) (1999) (stating that "[p]arental substitute authority does not include 
the use of corporal punishment"; also banning the withholding of meals as punishment); OR. 
ADMIN. R. 413-200-0170(1)(D-E), (G)(a), (c), (e-f), (j) (2001) (stating that "[f]oster parent(s) 
will provide positive discipline and guidance but shall not punish foster children"; prohibited 
punishments include "[p]hysical force or threat of physical force inflicted in any manner upon 
the child"; denying "food, clothing, shelter"; assigning "extremely strenuous exercise or 
work"; using or threatening to use "restraining devices"; and using a "shower as punishment"; 
allowing physical restraint only by trained foster care parents); 55 PA. CoDE § 3700.63(b)(2), 
(5), (8) (2001) (prohibiting "[p]hysical punishment inflicted upon the body"; denying "meals, 
clothing, or shelter"; and assigning "physically strenuous exercise or work solely as punish-
ment"); R.I. CoDE R. 03-000-021 (G)(f) (1998) (stating that foster parents should use "disci-
pline appropriate to the child's age and stage of development and without harsh, humiliating, 
or corporal punishment"); 114 S.C. CoDE ANN. REGS. 114-550 (J)(l3)(b) (2001) (prohibiting 
"[c]ruel, inhumane and inappropriate discipline," including "but not necessarily limited to the 
following: head shaving or any other dehumanizing or degrading act; prolonged/frequent de-
prival of food ... ; slapping or shaking"); TENN. CoMP. R. & REGS. R. 0250-4-2-.07(3)(e)(2-
3), (8) and (4)(b) (2001) (prohibiting "[c]orporal punishment"; the "[d]enial of meals, [and] 
daily needs"; and assigning "excessive or inappropriate work"; requiring strict monitoring of 
isolation techniques); UTAH ADMIN. CoDE R501-12-13(B) (2001) (stating that "[f]oster parents 
shall not use, nor permit the use of corporal punishment, physical or chemical restraint, inflic-
tion of bodily harm or discomfort, deprivation of meals ... "); VT. CoDE R. 13-162-
007.324(A)(.l)(.3-.4), .326.1 (1999) (stating that "[a] foster parent shall not subject a foster 
child to ... spanking, slapping, hitting, shaking or otherwise engaging in aggressive physical 
contact"; also banning required physical discomforts as from prolonged squatting, isolating "in 
a closet or locked room," depriving child of "food, water, rest or opportunity for toileting or 
bathing" and allowing physical restraint only if force used was "the least amount consistent 
with reducing the risk to a level manageable by less restrictive means"); 22 VA. ADMIN. CoDE 
§ 40-141-150 (2001) (stating that "[t]here shalf be no physical punishment, rough play or se-
vere disciplinary action administered to the body such as, but not limited to, spanking, roughly 
handling a child, shaking a child, forcing a child to assume an uncomfortable position (e.g., 
standing on one foot, keeping arms raised above or horizontal to the body), restraining to 
restrict movement through binding or tying, enclosing in a confined space, or using exercise as 
physical punishment"); Wis. ADMIN. ConE HSS § 56.07(5)(c), (f), (h-i) (2001) (prohibiting 
"[c]orporal punishment" and banning the deprivation of "meals," the confining "in a closet or 
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that school officials serve as state-employed caregivers (like foster-par-
ents) rather than as substitutes for biological parents. Though parents 
continue to assert a legat'privilege to physically punish their children,214 
locked room" and regulating the use of time-outs in unlocked rooms); CoDE OF Wvo. R. 049-
080-005 § 10(t)(iv)(C)(F)(u) (2001) (stating that foster parents may not punish "by shaking, 
striking or spanking" children or deprive them of meals; also strictly limiting the use of physi-
cal restraint). 
At least five states prohibit certain forms of corporal punishment or limit the use of cor-
poral punishment in certain circumstances. ALA. ADMIN. ConE r. 660-5c28-.02(6)(d)(2) 
(2001) (prohibiting "[s]lapping, striking, or hitting the child's face"; "[h]itting with a fist"; 
"[s]haking the child"; using "mechanical restraints," "belts, switches, extension cords, etc."); 
DEL. ConE Ann. tit. II, § 468 (1-2) (2000) (stating that use of force by foster parent is justifia-
ble if purpose was for "the prevention or punishment of misconduct," but determining that the 
following uses of force are unjustified: "[t]hrowing the child, kicking, burning, cutting, strik-
ing with a closed fist, interfering with breathing . . ."); IDAHO ADMIN. CoDE 
§ 16.06.02.405.03(e)(iii) (2000) (stating that "[n]o child may be subjected to cruel, severe, 
unusual or unnecessary punishment inflicted upon the body"); MicH. ADMIN. ConE r. 
400.194(7) (2000) (stating that "[s]evere corporal punishment shall be a basis for revocation of 
license"); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:42:05:15 (2001) (stating that "[a]ny discipline or control must be 
appropriate to the child's age and developmental level"); 40 TEx. ADMIN CoDE 
§ 720.243(h)(9) (200 I) (stating that "[i]f the policy of the foster family home permits spanking 
children less than five years old, spanking can only be administered with an open hand on a 
child's buttocks or hands"). 
At least three states require foster caregivers to maintain and submit written records of 
incidents involving corporal punishment. MoNT. ADMIN. R. 37.97.1011(10) (2001) (stating 
that "[a] report shall be completed and sent to the placing agency and licensing social worker 
by any foster parent involved in physical punishment"); NEv. ADMIN. ConE ch. 424, § 520(6) 
(2001) (stating that "[w]hen serious physical intervention is required by the caregiver in order 
to protect the child, others or property, an incident report must be filed within 48 hours to the 
division licensing representative and the agency responsible for the child"); 40 TEx. ADMIN 
ConE§ 720.243(h)(3) (2001) (stating that a "record shall be kept of all physical punishment"). 
At least two states appear to discourage, but not ban corporal punishment. N.C. ADMIN 
ConE tit. 10, r. 41F.070l(e)(2) (2001) (stating that "[c]orporal punishment should be 
avoided"); W.VA. CoDE ST. R. § 78-2-8.2(c)(6) (1999) (stating that family home study shall 
include a record of disciplinary techniques). 
In seven states, the statutes and administrative regulations appear to be silent on the issue 
of foster parents utilizing corporal punishment: Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, 
New York, Washington, and West Virginia. 
214 See, e.g., Victor I. Vieth, When Parental Discipline is a Crime: Overcoming the De-
fense of Reasonable Force, THE PRosECUTOR, July/Aug. 1998, at 29: 
States utilizing the majority rule hold that a parent is not criminally liable for an 
assault on a child if the blows to the child's body constitute "reasonable" force and 
are administered as a means of discipline .... Under the minority rule a parent is not 
criminally liable for an assault on a child even if the force is unreasonable so long as 
the parent does not act with malice. Under this rule, an "error in judgment" does not 
bring criminal liability. 
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a tradition with deep religious roots,Z 15 many have begun to advocate the 
abolition of corporal punishment even in the home.216 
Fifteen states now give local school boards discretion to decide 
whether to authorize corporal punishment as a means of discipline217 and 
one state recently repealed its prior statute prohibiting corporal punish-
ment.218 In addition, many states have enacted statutes that only gener-
215 See generally Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal 
Punishment Defense - "Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?," 1998 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 413, 415 (detailing a father's testimony that because the Bible allowed both corporal 
punishment and child sacfitice, beating a child is a more "merciful action"). See also Barbara 
Finkelstein, A Crucible of Contradictions:_ Historical Roots of Violence against Children in the 
United States, 40 HisT. EDuc. Q. I, 9 (2000) ("the power of 'old-fashioned' religious tradi-
tions is alive and well in the private unregulated spaces of homes, religious schools, public 
schools where corporal punishment is still legally sanctioned, and in a variety of neighborhood 
associations where corporal punishment is a daily occurrence and invocations of biblical au-
thority a commonplace justification for it."). 
216 See, e.g., Richard Garner, Fundamentally Speaking: Application of Ohio's Domestic 
Abuse Violence Law in Parental Discipline Cases: A Parental Perspective, 30 U. ToL. L. REv. 
I, 2 (1998) (contending that domestic violence Jaws and "revisionist judicial interpretation of 
the traditional parental privilege of corporal discipline, have begun to erode traditional and 
constitutionally-protected concepts of parental primacy and family privacy"); Mary Kay Kear-
ney, Substantive Due Process and Parental Corporal Punishment: Democracy and the Ex-
cluded Child, 32 SAN Dmao L. REv. I, 3, 46 (1995) (concluding that parents should not 
physically punish children "if they have other less restrictive ways of exercising control over 
them"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEo. WASH. L. 
REv. 1247, 1257 (I 999) (stating that "the ideology of [family] privacy may obscure and con-
done injustice to children, as it obscured and condoned injustice to women"). See generally 
Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, II YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 9, II (I 999) (stating 
that until recently "the European and American legal systems [had] a long history of complic-
ity in - and even approval of- intimate abuse, particularly when perpetrated by men against 
their wives and children" and stating that "by the late 1960s and early 1970s, the domestic 
violence movement came into full swing and prompted substantial improvement in statutory 
law"). In addition, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommended that parents abandon 
the use of physical punishment: 
Because of the negative consequences of spanking and because it has been demon-
strated to be no more effective than other approaches for managing undesired behav-
ior in children, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends the parents be 
encouraged and assisted in developing methods other than spanking in response to 
undesired behavior. 
Guidance for Effective Discipline, 101 PEDIATRICS 723, 726 (1998) (Am. Acad. Pediatrics, 
RE9740). 
217 ALA. CoDE§ 16-28A-l (1995); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 15-843(B)(2) (West 1999); 
ARK. CoDE ANN. § 6-18-505 (Michie 1999); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 14, § 701 (1999); FLA. 
STAT. ANN.§ 232.27(J)(j) (West 1998); GA. CoDE. ANN. § 20-2-730 (1996); KY. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§§ 158.444(1), 158.444(2)(b)(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 416.1B 
(West Supp. 2000); Miss. CoDE ANN. § 37-11-57 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.261(1) 
(2000); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 22-5-4.3A, 22-5-4.3B (Michie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 115C-
390, 115C-391 (1999); OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 3319.41 (1995); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 59-63-
260 (Law. Co-op. 1990); WYo. STAT. ANN § 21-4-308 (Michie 1999). 
218 N.D. CENT. CODE 15-47-47 (1999). 
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ally refer to a school board's authority to discipline.219 Of these, eight 
authorize school officials to use reasonable force to foster a safe and 
educational environment.220 Only two states have failed to enact a stat-
ute addressing the use of force by school officials, whether to physically 
punish or to control students. 221 
In addition, even in those states that either directly authorize physi-
cal punishment or that grant educational entities the discretion to do so, 
school officials may still lose immunity222 from state-law claims chal-
lenging the use of force where: the force constitutes unreasonable disci-
pline;223 the force used is not "administered in good faith ... [and is] 
excessive or unduly severe;"224 the official "exhibit[s] a wanton and will-
ful disregard of human rights or safety";225 the force is "excessive ... or 
219 See, e.g., IDAHO CoDE§ 33-1224 (1995) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a teacher to 
carry out the rules and regulations of the board of trustees in controlling and maintaining 
discipline"); IND. CoDE ANN. § 20-8.1-5.1-3 ( 1995) (stating that "[i]n all matters relating to the 
discipline and conduct of students, school corporation personnel stand the relation of parents 
and guardians to the students of the school corporation"; adding that "school corporation per-
sonnel have the right ... to take any disciplinary action necessary to promote student conduct 
that conforms with an orderly and effective educational system"). 
220 Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-!-703(1)(a) (West 1998); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53a-18(6) (West 2001); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(2) (West 1996); N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN.§ 627:6(II) (1996); N.Y. PENAL LAw§ 35.10 (McKinney 1999); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 18, §§ 509(2)(i}, 509(2)(ii) (1998); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws § 13-32-2 (Michie 1991); TEx. 
PENAL CoDE ANN. § 9.62 (West 1994). 
221 See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-890l(b) and (c) (West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 16-12-3 (1956). In contrast to school officials who inflict physical punishment, school offi-
cials who use reasonable force to maintain a safe, non-violent school environment often have 
broader immunity under state law. For example, the District of Columbia forbids its charter 
schools from using physical punishment but allows officials to use "reasonable force to defend 
themselves against physical assaults by the students." D. C. CoDE ANN. § 31-2817(f) (1998). 
222 Some scholars have criticized states for granting school officials immunity for hitting 
students. See Carolyn Peri Weiss, Curbing Violence or Teaching It: Criminal Immunity for 
Teachers Who Inflict Corporal Punishment, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1251, 1278-79 (1996) (exten-
sively criticizing Alabama's statute affording civil and criminal immunity for school officials 
who use physical force and stating that "teachers are already afforded the same legal protection 
as other citizens with regard to self-defense and the defense of others"). 
223 Utah allows corporal punishment if school officials have consent from the parents or 
guardian. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 53-11-802 ( 1997). It also grants school officials immunity for 
using physical punishment but only if the force would "constitute reasonable discipline." 
UTAH CoDE ANN. § 53A-ll-804(1)(a) (1999) (stating that "[c]orporal punishment which 
would ... be considered reasonable discipline of a minor ... may not be used as a basis for 
any civil or criminal action"). 
224 Georgia leaves the issue of corporal punishment to the "area, county, or independent 
board of education," GA. CoDE. ANN. § 20-2-730 (1996}, but grants both civil and criminal 
immunity to school officials as long as the physical punishment was in "good faith and ... not 
excessive or unduly severe." GA. CoDE. ANN. § 22-2-732 (1996). 
225 In Mississippi, physical punishment by school officials does not constitute "negli-
gence or child abuse" if performed reasonably and in compliance with federal law and "rules 
or regulations of the State Board of Education or local school board," Mtss. CoDE ANN. § 37-
11-57 (2) (1999), but immunity is granted unless the hitting was "in bad faith or with mali-
cious purpose or in a manner exhibiting a wanton and willful disregard of human rights or 
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[constitutes] cruel and unusual punishment";226 the force used violates 
the local school board's disciplinary policy;227 or where school officials 
act with a "malicious purpose."228 In addition, one state limits school 
officials' immunity to punitive damages, as at common-law.229 Two 
others grant discretion to the board of education merely to "[i]nsure any 
employee of the school district ... from an act ... within the scope of 
employment;230 and others allow indemnification only if the actions do 
not constitute "willful, wanton or malicious wrongdoing,"231 "gross neg-
safety," id., or constituted "excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment," Miss. CoDE 
ANN. § 37-11-57 (1). 
226 Florida grants local schools boards the discretion to use physical punishment, FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 232.27(l)(J) (West 1998), but it bars immunity if the officials use "excessive 
force or cruel and unusu~l punishment." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.275 (West 1998). 
227 Alabama specifically leaves the question of physical punishment to the school board, 
ALA. CoDE § 16-28A-I (1995), but grants immunity both from civil and criminal actions if 
school officials followed the policy, ALA. CoDE§ 16-28A-1 (1995) (stating that "[s]o long as 
teachers follow approved policy in the exercise of their responsibility to maintain discipline in 
their classroom, such teacher shall be immune from civil and criminal liability"); Arkansas 
specifically leaves the question of physical punishment to the school board, ARK. CoDE ANN. 
§ 6-18-505 (Michie 1999), but grants immunity from civil liability if there was "substantial 
compliance with the district's written student discipline policy," ARK. CoDE ANN.§ 6-17-112 
(Michie 1999); Indiana that school officials "stand the relation of parents and guardians to the 
students" and that they have the "right ... to take any disciplinary action necessary to promote 
... an orderly and effective educational system," IND. CoDE ANN. § 20-8.1-5.1-3 (1995), but it 
limits immunity to school officials who acted "reasonably under a disciplinary policy adopted 
under" a school's corporation disciplinary policy, IND. CoDE ANN.§ 34-13-3-3 (19) (Michie 
2000); Missouri sp~ifically leaves the question of physical punishment to the school board, 
Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 160.261(1) (2000), but states that "[t]eachers ... shall not be civilly liable 
when acting in conformity with the established policy of discipline developed by each board," 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 160.261(6) (2000). 
228 Ohio prohibits corporal punishment unless the school board adopts a resolution per-
mitting it and forms a task force that will regularly study disciplinary procedures, OHio REv. 
CoDE ANN.§ 3319.41 (1995), but grants immunity to officials as long as there was no mali-
cious purpose in the act, OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2744.03(6) (1995). 
229 Arizona allows the school board to decide whether to authorize physical punishment, 
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 15-843(B) (2) (West 1999). Arizona preserves common-law immu-
nity, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12-820.05 (West 1999), but makes it the exception to the rule. 
See Doe ex rei. Doe v. State, 2000 WL 730356 (Ariz. App. Div. I, June 8, 2000) ("liability of 
public servants is the rule in Arizona and immunity is the exception."). Punitive damages are 
barred by statute. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.04 (West 2000). 
230 North Carolina allows school officials to use reasonable force to correct pupils, N.C. 
GEN. STAT.§§ 115C-390, 115C-391 (1999), but only authorizes insurance to cover the costs of 
judgments against the officials if their actions were without malice, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-
43(b) (1999). Oklahoma does not prohibit a teacher from using "ordinary force as a means of 
discipline, including but not limited to spanking, switching or paddling," OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21 § 844 (West 1998), but it only allows school districts to insure school officials, OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 51 § 168(2) (West 2000) (stating that the "board of education of any school 
district may ... [i]nsure any employee of the school district against all or any part of his 
liability for injury ... resulting from an act ... in the scope of employment"). 
231 Tennessee permits teachers to use "corporal punishment in a reasonable manner, 
TENN. CoDE ANN. § 49-6-64103 (1996), but bars indemnification by the "local education 
agency" if the act was "willful, wanton, or malicious," TENN. CoDE ANN. § 49-6-42ll(a)(2) 
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ligence," or "intentional acts."232 Another state provides for state-funded 
legal representation of the challenged official only where the corporal 
punishment is administered in good faith. 233 
Therefore, since Ingraham, states have increasingly recognized the 
importance of children's interest in personal security both in the class-
room and at home by both limiting the authority of public school teach-
ers to physically punish students and by increasing their scrutiny of the 
force parents use to discipline their children. These changes reflect an 
evolving society, one that understands protecting children from harm fur-
thers the community interest as well as the child's individual interest. 
C. PsYCHOLOGICAL VIEWS OF CoRPORAL PuNISHMENT IN THE 
ScHOOLS AND AT HoME 
Numerous educational psychologists support these changes in state 
practices.234 Many of them have vehemently condemned using physical 
force to punish students and several have linked some types of discipline 
to later violent behavior in students. 235 In effect, they argue that the use 
of physical punishment teaches students to be violent themselves.236 
With the nation's growing concern about violence in public schools, one 
might naturally question any movement to limit school officials' options 
in controlling the student environment. Yet, physical punishment of stu-
dents is justifiable only if it furthers the goals of public education. Ac-
cording to these modern theorists, public schools actually undermine 
their educational goals by using physical punishment to discipline chil-
dren. Still, just as the common law recognized the privilege to use force 
to defend oneself from impending physical harm, no psychologist has 
advocated that public school officials never touch students in their own 
(1999). Louisiana similarly grants discretion and bars indemnification for "intentional wrong-
ful act or gross negligence." LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13:5108.1 (West 2000). 
232 Delaware allows the local school board to authorize physical punishment, DEL. CoDE 
ANN. tit. 14 § 701 (1999), but it affords officials only indemnification except for "intentional 
acts or ... gross negligence." DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 14 § 1095 (1999). 
233 Kentucky allows state officials to request legal aid from the Attorney General, but the 
Attorney General can refuse to represent the official, Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.211 & § 
12.212, and the Kentucky Supreme Court has ruled that the school district and school officials 
are state entities and employees, see Reis v. Campbell County Bd. of Educ., 938 S.W.2d 880, 
885 (Ky. 1996). In South Carolina, when a teacher requests aid, it becomes the "duty of the 
school district ... to appear and defend the action or proceeding in his behalf," S.C. CoDE 
ANN.§ 59-17-110 (Law. Co-op. 1999). 
234 See infra notes 263-75 and accompanying text. 
235 See, e.g., A. Troy Adams, The Status of School Discipline and Violence, 567 ANNALS 
AM. AcAD. PoL. & Soc. Set 140, 143 (2000) (explaining that "[s]chool violence and disci-
pline are not the same concept, but they are related concepts" and equating physical punish-
ment with violent behavior that has a "lifetime impact"). 
236 See, e.g., Bitensky, supra note 197, at 425 (citing numerous psychological studies 
relating corporal punishment to increased potential for aggressive behavior); Orentlicher, 
supra note 190, at 157. 
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defense or when necessary to control the classroom environment.237 The 
difficulty is in determining when the use of force is necessary and when 
it does more harm than good. 
Many modern psychologists suggest that, in most situations, striking 
a school child causes more psychological damage than would another 
form of discipline.238 This modern view sharply contrasts with the ma-
jority opinion in lngraham239 which described physical punishment as an 
effective disciplinary tool, and reasoned that, if anything, granting stu-
dents a hearing before punishment would cause more psychological harm 
because such process would increase the student's anxiety and under-
mine the ability of teachers to effectively control the classroom.240 To-
day, educational psychologists such as Irwin A. Hyman241 and Murray 
A. Straus,242 as well as social historians and physicians,243 advocate the 
elimination of physical punishment both at school and in the home. As 
237 See, e.g., IRWIN A. HYMAN ET AL., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND SCHOOL VIOLENCE: THE 
TEACHER VARIANCE APPROACH 334-35 (1997) (discussing the difference between force used 
for self-protection and force used to punish: "all laws and regulations regarding corporal pun-
ishment in schools protect educators' rights to use force to quell disturbances, and to protect 
themselves, others' property, or students from self-injury"). 
238 The American Academy of Pediatrics, for example, denounces spanking, listing the 
following problems, among others with the practice: 
[I] Spanking children [less than eighteen] months of age increases the chance of 
physical injury, and the child is unlikely to understand the connection between the 
behavior and the punishment. 
[2] Although spanking may result in a reaction of shock by the child and cessation 
of the undesired behavior, repeated spanking may cause agitated, aggressive behav-
ior in the child. 
[3] Spanking models aggressive behavior as a solution to conflict and has been asso-
ciated with increased aggression in preschool and school children. 
[4] Spanking and threats of spanking lead to altered parent-child relationships, mak-
ing discipline more difficult when physical punishment is no longer an option, such 
as with adolescents. 
[5] Spanking is no more effective as a long-term strategy than other approaches, and 
reliance on spanking as a discipline approach makes other discipline strategies less 
effective to use. Time-out and positive reinforcement of other behaviors are more 
difficult to implement and take longer to become effective when spanking has previ-
ously been a primary method of discipline. 
[6] A pattern of spanking may be sustained or increased. Because spanking may 
provide the parent some relief from anger, the likelihood that the parent will spank 
the child in the future is increased. 
Guidance for Effective Discipline, supra note 216, at 726. 
239 See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children's 
Rights, 16 NovA L. REv. 711, 730 (1992) (criticizing Ingraham v. Wright as ignoring "the 
significant body of psychological literature in both interpersonal relationships and learning 
theory which shows that aggression tends to breed aggressive behavior"). 
240 430 U.S. 651, 680, 681 n.51 (1977). 
241 See supra note 237. 
242 See MuRRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL ouT OF THEM: CoRPORAL PuNISHMENT 
IN AMERICAN fAMILIES (1994). 
243 See, e.g., GREVEN, supra note 189, at 9 (stating that "[c]hild abuse takes many 
forms[;]one of them is physical punishment"). 
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discussed further below, these psychologists contend that when an au-
thority figure, be it a parent or school official, strikes a child, the likeli-
hood of significant psychological injury increases. 
Society's continued acceptance of corporal punishment despite evi-
dence of the harm it causes244 may be grounded in our sociological past. 
Historically, American culture encouraged wives to believe that "they 
'deserved it'" and viewed beating slaves as a mere form of "disci-
pline."245 Today "[w]e no longer permit the hitting of servants, appren-
tices, wives, prisoners, and members of the armed forces"246 but many 
still support the physical disciplining of children perhaps because they 
themselves were struck as children.247 Psychologists note that few peo-
ple are aware of the effects of corporal punishment on either themselves 
or their children and theorize that this lack of awareness may make them 
more likely to hit their own children as well.248 In short, hitting children 
is violence that begets violence. 249 
244 PAULA M. SHORT ET AL., RETHINKING STUDENT DISCIPLINE: ALTERNATIVES THAT 
WoRK 85 (stating that "[c]hild abuse and violent crime may ... trace their origin to corporal 
punishment"); STRAUS, supra note 242, at 12 (noting that scholars have ignored the studies 
that suggest that 99 percent of the parents [that] "hit their children," produce "aggressive 
children"). 
245 STRAUS, supra note 242, at x. 
24 6 /d. at 10. 
247 See, e.g., OREVEN, supra note 189, at 9 (contending that parents today continue hitting 
their own children because they were struck by their own parents). Parents may also fear that 
because they have hit their kids, they could be labeled child-abusers under psychological theo-
ries banning physical punishment. /d. See also STRAUS, supra note 242, at 61 ("[R]egardless 
of the age and sex of the child, the more corporal punishment parents experienced as children 
the more likely they are to do the same to their own children."). 
248 See, e.g., Patrick V. Gaffney, A Study of Preservice Teachers' Beliefs about Various 
Issues and Myths Regarding the Use of Scholastic Corporal Punishment, at 5 (May 20, 1997), 
available at http://www.edrs.com/DocLibrary4/1197/ED409315.PDF (noting that "the harmful 
effects of [physical punishment] do not become obvious right away, often not for years"); 
GREVEN, supra note 189, at 126 (explaining that "few adults recall the anger they experienced 
as children when being punished and hurt by their parents" because they often repress their 
rage and pain). See also Koocher, supra note 239, at 730 ("A common rationale cited by 
supporters of official corporal punishment tends to be, 'It taught me a lesson when I was their 
age.' Of course, all that is truly taught with such techniques is how to pass on the tradition of 
abuse."). 
249 HYMAN ET AL., supra note 237, at 336 ("Because hitting at home does not help [chil-
dren,] it is just as useless and counterproductive in school. The old saw that 'violence breeds 
violence' is supported by this finding. Teachers who do not paddle are most often those who 
were rarely if ever spanked or paddled as children."). See also Murray A. Straus & Carrie L. 
Yodanis, Corporal Punishment in Adolescence and Physical Assaults on Spouses in Later 
Life: What Accounts for the Link? 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 825, 837-38 (1996) (summarizing 
the author's study on the effects of corporal punishment and its link to increased family vio-
lence and depression). 
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1. Inflicting Psychological Harm 
Psychologists have identified various types of harm that can arise 
when one is physically punished by an authority figure. At least one 
study links the use of corporal punishment to depression, which may in 
tum cause numerous other problems250 such as a greater propensity to 
commit suicide,251 aggression, inability to succeed in the workplace252, 
and physical expressions of anger toward others.253 In addition, children 
disciplined through physical punishment "are less likely to be able to 
learn to solve problems logically"254 and may experience greater difficul-
ties developing "an internalized conscience."255 Striking children causes 
them to be fearful and, often, to repress their anger.256 This may in tum 
lead to "the stifling of empathy and compassion for oneself and 
others"257 because, when parents strike children, they are in effect both 
manifesting and teaching "indifference to suffering."258 Controlling this 
internal anger can also result in children later manifesting "obsessive" 
and "compulsive" characters; they may live rigidly as a way of contain-
ing their deep-seated anger.259 In addition, they may experience a 
profound sense of ambivalence - love and hate for parents and them-
selves.260 Many times, children cannot process this hate and they experi-
ence what psychologists call "dissociation" - the most "basic means of 
survival for many children" who need to "render unconscious" unbear-
able "feelings and experiences."261 As a result, they feel disconnected 
from their inner feelings and the "external world. "262 
250 GREVEN, supra note 189, at 132; STRAUS, supra note 242, at 77. 
251 STRAUs, supra note 242, at 78. 
252 /d. at 144-45 (noting that this inability to function well in the workplace seemed to 
apply only to college graduates whose success tended to be undermined by "depression, an 
inclination to physical violence, a sense of powerlessness, and a lack of internalized moral 
standards"). 
253 /d. at 107. 
254 Patrick V. Gaffney, Arguments in Opposition to the Use of Corporal Punishment: A 
Comprehensive Review of the Literature, at 10 (Mar. 17, 1997), available at http://www .edrs. 
com/DocLibrary4/0897/ED406054.PDF; see also PAULA M. SHORT ET AL., supra note 244, at 
85 (stating that "[p]roblem solving via violence and aggression, learned in childhood, likely 
carries over into adulthood"). 
255 STRAUS, supra note 242, at 96. 
256 GREVEN, supra note 189, at 132. 
257 !d. at 127. 
258 /d. 
259 See id. at 135. 
260 /d. at 142-47. 
261 /d. at 148. 
262 !d. 
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2. Ineffective Discipline in the Classroom 
Using physical punishment to discipline children thus significantly 
increases the risk of profound and prolonged psychological injury. But 
educational psychologists also reject physical punishment as an effective 
form of discipline. 263 Fundamentally, this type of punishment distracts 
school officials from the task of understanding what motivated the dis-
ruptive behavior in the first place.264 It also "may produce an anxious, 
fearful, angry, and aggressive climate" in the classroom.265 As result, 
even students who merely witness the hitting may experience both 
"alienation and anxiety."266 The presence of corporal punishment in the 
public schools is also linked to increased absenteeism and dropout 
rates.267 
The act of striking students for punishment also has other unin-
tended results. Even though a quick slap may stop disruptive behavior, it 
ultimately escalates the need for more hitting, with officials needing to 
employ "sterner and sterner measures" to control the classroom.268 Once 
officials administer this type of discipline, they face the difficult task of 
establishing "open, trusted-based communication" with those students 
who have received the corporal punishment.269 Furthermore, rather than 
curbing inappropriate behavior, corporal punishment tends to teach stu-
dents to solve their problems through deviousness and aggression.270 
Some psychologists have noted that teachers who administer physical 
punishment may also inadvertently undermine their own authority. For 
example, some "males tend to equate receiving corporal punishment with 
claims to manhood, group solidarity, personal belonging, and a rise in 
social status and standing among one's peers," thus leading these stu-
dents to actually enjoy corporal punishment rather than regarding it as a 
form of discipline.271 
263 See Gaffney, supra note 254, at 5 (examining numerous psychological studies and 
concluding that "with few exceptions - this particular procedure is neither suggested nor 
defended by any recognized authority on classroom management and discipline"); but cf. 
Katherine Hunt Federle, Violence is the Word, 37 Hous. L. REv. 97, 106-07 (2000) (support-
ing Gaffney's basic conclusions but noting the limitations of psychological studies that analyze 
the effects of corporal punishment). 
264 See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 254, at 9-10 (stating that "corporal punishment does not 
achieve its stated goal of the establishment and the preservation of discipline because it is 
treating the symptoms, as opposed to the cause, of children's misbehavior"). 
265 See, e.g., SHORT, ET AL., supra note 244, at 85. 
266 /d. at 84. 
267 !d. at 85. 
268 /d. at 85. 
269 /d. at 84. 
270 HYMAN ET AL., supra note 237, at 336 (stating that "[w]itnessing and experiencing 
corporal punishment, a form of aggression, results in modeling of aggression"); SHORT ET AL., 
supra note 244, at 84. 
271 Gaffney, supra note 254, at 6. 
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Educational psychologists advocate numerous alternatives to corpo-
ral punishment that are more effective disciplinary tools including behav-
ioral modification, assertive discipline, and logical consequences.272 
Such methods take the student's age into account, thereby echoing the 
T.L.O. Court's acknowledgement that the reasonableness of a punish-
ment varies according to whether it is appropriate for a student's age 
group. For example, with respect to younger students, "rewards ap-
proaches often are the most effective."273 For older students, rewards 
systems are less effective, but entering into "behavior contracts" with 
students, sending "behavioral report cards to parents,"274 or administer-
ing in-school suspensions275 may be more effective alternatives. These 
modern disciplinary approaches lend support to the states' strong trend 
toward banning or limiting the use of physical punishment in the class-
room. Courts should consider these important perspectives when assess-
ing the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of corporal punishment. 
272 See, e.g., SANDY GARRETT, A HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATIVES TO CoRPORAL PuNISH· 
MENT 23-32 (4th ed. 1993); FREDERIC H. JoNES, PosiTIVE CLASSROOM DISCIPLINE 79-140 
(1987) (describing how school officials establish important classroom limits); CHARLES H. 
WOLFGANG, SOLVING DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS 13-264 (1995) (describing nine models for disci-
plining students). Jones examined the Rogerian (emotionally supportive) model, id. at 13-39; 
the transactional model, id. at 45-61; the "social discipline model of Rudolf Dreikurs," id. at 
65-90; Glasser's reality therapy, id. at 97-115; the 'judicious discipline model," id. at 
119-48; the "behavior analysis model," id. at 149-92; the "positive discipline model," id. at 
195-245; the "assertive discipline model," id. at 249-65; and the "Dobson Love and Punish-
ment Model," id. at 271-81. 
Of these nine different models discussed by Wolfgang, only the last one - the "Dobson 
Love and Punishment Model" - advocated the use of physical punishments. In describing 
this latter model, Jones made two important points. First, Dobson advocates hitting children in 
order to further his religious belief that children will go "to Hell" if they do not adhere to 
boundaries. /d. at 273. Wolfgang stated that "Dobson, a former educator who is now a psy-
chologist, does not separate his psychological views from his religious ones." /d. at 274. 
Second, other psychologists fundamentally disagree with Dobson. /d. at 280. Dobson's relig-
ious view of hitting children is one that historian Philip Greven examined extensively in his 
book advocating the elimination of physical punishments for children. GREVEN, supra note 
189, at 46-72. Greven discerned a direct link between fundamentalist Christians' religious 
perspectives and their views of hitting children: "The long-sustained persistence of melancholy 
and depression among twice-born Protestants is clearly no accident, since it has consistently 
been paralleled by the tradition of assault, coercion, and violence against children committed 
with the rod, the belt, the hand, and other such instruments of parental discipline." /d. at 134. 
273 SHORT ET AL., supra note 244, at 86 (discussing "behavior management techniques" 
involving the giving or withholding of "rewards" that compel the teacher to first examine the 
reason for the misbehavior and then to reinforce the positive behaviors that are "incompatible 
with" the identified misconduct). 
274 /d. at 86-87. 
275 !d. at 87. 
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V. REASONABLE AND UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL FORCE 
IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
In assessing whether school officials have violated the Fourth 
Amendment's standard of reasonableness, courts must apply the Su-
preme Court's contextual balancing test,Z76 which considers the unique 
relationship of students to school officials, modern trends toward alterna-
tive methods of punishment, whether the use of the punishment furthered 
educational goals, and the fact-specific circumstances of a given case. 
Although one cannot exhaustively describe the protean circumstances 
that school officials encounter, schools generally administer corporal 
punishment to students either as a means of controlling them or punish-
ing them. When school officials use physical force to control unruly 
students and restore peace to the school environment, they have broad 
discretion to act under what the Supreme Court labels their "custodial" 
and "tutelary" powers. However, the use of physical force to punish stu-
dents is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As discussed 
below, these conclusions complement the Supreme Court's Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in both the law enforcement and "special 
needs" contexts. 
A. ANALOGIZING PuBLIC ScHOOL TEACHERS To PoucE OFFICERs: 
UsiNG FoRCE To CoNTROL DISRUPTION 
In the context of public schools, determining what constitutes force 
to "control" versus force to "punish" may seem a difficult distinction to 
make. One way to assess the difference is to consider how the Supreme 
Court describes the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of police of-
ficers' use of deadly and non-deadly force when subduing suspects. This 
line of cases indicates that the use of force is never reasonable when used 
to "punish" suspects; the Fourth Amendment privileges law enforce-
ment's use of physical force only when necessary in furtherance of an 
investigation or in apprehending suspects. Similarly, one might argue 
that school officials may use force to control and apprehend disruptive 
students but may not use force for the explicit purpose of punishing stu-
dents for their misbehavior. 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Tennessee v. Garner and Graham 
v. Connor explored reasonableness as applied to criminal policing func-
tions.277 These decisions set forth a three-factor test for assessing the 
reasonableness of police officers using deadly and non-deadly force that 
may also offer some guidance in shaping the reasonableness standard as 
applied to public school officials. In both Garner and Graham, the Court 
276 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
277 See supra notes 13-42 and accompanying text. 
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considered: (1) the nature of the suspect's alleged offense; (2) the risk to 
others if not apprehended; and (3) whether the suspect resisted the of-
ficers' use of physical force. The Court did not limit its analysis to these 
factors, but simply used them as aids in determining how to weigh the 
opposing sides of the balancing scales: the suspect's interest in personal 
security and the government's interest in effective law enforcement, with 
society having an interest on both sides of the sca1e.278 
In applying these three factors, the Court created a categorical ap-
proach for the use of deadly force and an objective balancing test for the 
use of non-deadly force. The Garner decision established that the Fourth 
Amendment permits police officers to use deadly force against suspects 
only when the alleged crime involves the threatened or actual infliction 
of serious bodily injury to another, reasoning that the suspect's funda-
mental interest in his or her life outweighs the state's interest in appre-
hending non-violent offenders. However, when the issue is the 
reasonableness of using non-deadly force, courts and juries must con-
sider "the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv-
ing" about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situa-
tion."279 In short, when law enforcement officers use non-deadly force, 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness does not necessarily demand that 
they use the least intrusive measures possible to apprehend suspects so 
long as their actions are objectively reasonable under the circumstances 
of the moment. Officers may act reasonably with bad intentions, and 
may act unreasonably with good intentions; the reasonableness inquiry 
focuses only on the means used to further the law enforcement goal of 
investigating and apprehending suspects, not the officers' individual 
states of mind. 280 
278 See, e.g., SATNAM CHOONGH, PoLICING AS SociAL DisCIPLINE 25-42 (1997). 
Choongh described the two classic views of policing, the "crime control model" and the "due 
process model," which characterize differently society's interest in this balancing process: 
The crime control model operates on the assumption that the primary purpose of a 
criminal process is to repress crime. The State cannot guarantee the social freedom 
of its citizens unless it has at its disposal procedures which efficiently screen sus-
pects, determine guilt and secure appropriate punishment for those convicted of 
crime .... Whereas the crime control model places immense faith in the ability of 
the police to use their administrative expertise to discover the truth, the organizing 
matrix of the due process model is the proposition that informal police procedures 
are susceptible to misuse and prone to produce error. 
/d. at 26, 27. Applying these models to the Fourth Amendment's balancing process, an advo-
cate of the crime control model would view society's interests as protected by giving more 
weight to police officers' ability to apprehend suspects, but an advocate of the due process 
model would view society's interest as represented in the individual apprehended, more ques-
tioning of the procedures police officers used. 
279 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
280 /d. In discussing the analogous question of what constitutes a "seizure" under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court similarly rejected using the minds of individual officials to 
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Courts may analogize the principles of Garner and Graham to the 
use of physical force by school officials. Both officers and school offi-
cials seek to control an environment as a means of furthering their ulti-
mate objective, whether it be efficient law enforcement or effective 
student education. Recently, a police chief and an educator drew this 
analogy in proposing a continuum of physical force for educators,281 one 
similar to the continuum that police officers apply when using non-
deadly force. 282 Police Chief David Frisby and Professor Joseph Beck-
ham created three categories for school disciplinary infractions: "verbal 
disruption," "property damage," and "menacing disruption."283 Frisby 
and Beckham described these categories as running along a vertical line, 
beginning with verbal disruption and ascending to menacing disrup-
detennine whether a seizure had or had not occurred. Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 
598 (1989). The Brower Court stated that it would not "distinguish between a roadblock that 
is designed to give the oncoming driver the option of a voluntary stop ... and a roadblock that 
is designed precisely to produce a collision." /d. What mattered was that police officers inten-
tionally stopped the suspect, even if they subjectively intended a stop that did not cause the 
suspect's death. The Brower Court added another example of how an officer's intent does not 
resolve the Fourth Amendment seizure question: 
In determining whether the means used that terminates the freedom of movement is 
the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a line, or we 
will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been stopped by the acciden-
tal discharge of a gun with which he was mearit only to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet 
in the heart that was meant only for the leg. 
!d. at 598-99. 
281 David Frisby & Joseph C. Beckham, Developing School Policies on the Application of 
Reasonable Force, 122 EDuc. L. REP. 27, 30-32 (1998). 
282 See, e.g., Paul W. Brown, The Continuum of Force in Community Policing, 58 FED. 
PROBATION 31, 31 (1994 ). Probation Officer Brown described a continuum of force: 
A use of force continuum is a model by which an officer can choose verbal and 
physical reactions to a subject's behavior from a range of options and adequately 
stop the subject's hostile behavior and establish command and control over the sub-
ject, but not more .... Most continuum of force models are similar and use the 
concept of a pyramid or a ladder. At the bottom are the least forceful and most 
reversible techniques and at the top, the most forceful and the least reversible. If 
there is a starting point or beginning in the continuum of force, it is usually the 
officer's mere presence. At the top is lethal force, usually illustrated by the use of a 
firearm. 
!d. Brown described the following as incremental steps for gaining control of suspects: (I) 
"officer presence"; (2) "body language and verbal commands"; (3) "control techniques and 
physical defense tactics"; (4) "personal defense sprays," such as pepper spray, Mace, or tear 
gas; (5) ''striking and jabbing instruments," such as "batons, expandable batons, and black-
jacks"; and (6) "deadly force," which includes firearms and other possible weapons "such as a 
baseball bat, a knife, or a vase." /d. at 32. See also Robert G. Hanna, Excessive Use of Force, 
in How TO HANDLE UNREASONABLE FORCE LITIGATION: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STRATE-
GIES IN POLICE MISCONDUCT CASES 355, 357 (1998) (stating that "(m]ost police training in-
cludes some version of use of force continuum"); Kevin Parsons, Decision to Use Force: The 
Confrontation Continuum, in 8 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEY FEES ANNUAL 
HANDBOOK 115, 117-20 (1992) (listing six levels of "force" used by police officers: "dia-
logue," "escort," "pain compliance," "mechanical control," "baton," and "firearms"). 
283 David Frisby & Joseph C. Beckham, supra note 281, at 32. 
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tion.284 A horizontal line intersects at a right angle, indicating what con-
stitutes appropriate disciplinary responses by educators.285 Nearest the 
intersecting lines is "verbal control," an appropriate response to offenses 
such as "talking" and "cursing in class"; in the middle of the bottom line 
is "touch control," which addresses "property damage" offenses such as 
"breaking windows" or "smashing computers."286 Finally, at the "de-
fense level" of control, educators might physically grab or strike students 
who are either "displaying" or "attacking with a deadly weapon."287 
Such striking of students would only be permitted as a defensive act used 
to control a violent student and would not be acceptable as a method of 
punishment. 288 
An alternative to the "continuum of force" model is the "wheel" 
model. The Federal Bureau of Investigation289 and "wheel" model pro-
ponents believe that one problem with a force continuum approach is that 
officers may mistakenly believe that they have "to escalate through the 
continuum to reach the proper level of force."290 Under a "wheel" model 
theory, officers still have the same options available under a continuum 
approach - "command presence, voice commands, controlling force, in-
juring force, and deadly force"291 - but the focus is on what may be 
variable degrees of "reasonable force" during a police officer's encounter 
with a suspect.292 In other words, the "wheel swings both ways," al-
lowing an officer to escalate or deescalate the level of force used in re-
sponse to "the officer[s'] reasonable perception of the suspect's apparent 
threat at any given moment."29 3 
284 /d. 
285 /d. 
286 /d. at 31. 
287 /d. 
288 /d. at 28. Such an approach is thus consistent with a Fourth Amendment theory of 
reasonableness that permits the use of physical force in the public schools only as a tool to 
control an unruly student. 
289 Interview with John Hall, Legal Instructor for FBI, in Quantico, Va. (Aug. II, 2000). 
Agent Hall stated that the FBI is not opposed to institutions training police officers using a 
continuum of force model, but that officers may inadvertently misinterpret what the continuum 
means by thinking that they must exhaust all other means before using deadly force. Deadly 
force is permissible when the circumstances fall within the parameter set by the Supreme 
Court in Tennessee v. Garner. Hall added that, to be effective, such a continuum would need 
to have a very identifiable point beyond which the use of deadly force would be permissible. 
Hall's viewpoint is consistent not only with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, but also with 
how other federal courts and juries have applied Garner to a variety of facts. 
290 Brown, supra note 282, at 32. 
291 /d. 
292 /d. (citing John Williams, Use-of-Force Wheel, PoucE MARKSMAN 48-49 (July/Aug. 
1994)). 
293 !d. Brown offered the following illustration of the "wheel" model: 
For example, the officer receives information on a suspect who has been involved in 
a disturbance. The officer confronts the suspect. At this point, no weapons have 
been observed by the officer. The wheel of force will spin to a stop at Command 
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The continuum of force model and the alternative "wheel" approach 
are each consistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment objec-
tive reasonableness standard and with modem educational psychologists' 
views of disciplining students and maintaining control in the classroom. 
Under either approach, the appropriate level of force varies with the con-
text. School officials respond based on the particular school infraction 
committed. In both models, the mere presence of an official and/or the 
issuance of verbal commands are in themselves types of "force" that 
might control a situation. Educational psychologists suggest that this 
type of non-physical force is the best way to control the learning environ-
ment in the public schools while minimizing psychological damage to 
the disciplined student.294 Furthermore, both models permit the use of 
force only to control students, never to punish them. This is consistent 
with the Graham Court's concern that the use of force be objectively 
reasonable. The limitations on the use of force proposed by the contin-
uum and wheel concepts also accord with the modern trend among the 
states toward banning corporal punishment in the classroom, 295 and with 
the Supreme Court's express emphasis in Ingraham v. Wright on can-
vassing state practices.296 
The Fourth Amendment applies when school officials and police 
officers use physical force to "seize" students or suspects. In the class-
room, school officials may block or grab students who attempt to damage 
property or hurt another person. Under either model, this type of force is 
proportionate to the offender's actions. Courts should view these types 
of controlling actions the way they do police officers' actions in control-
ling suspects: "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer [or public school of-
ficial] on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."297 
Presence and Voice Commands and the officer identifies himself and tells the sus-
pect to stop. 
As the suspect realizes the officer is speaking to him, simultaneously recogniz-
ing the officer as a threat to his freedom, he reaches in his waistband and attempts to 
draw a partially concealed handgun. The butt of the weapon is now visible to the 
officer. The wheel of force now spins to Deadly Force. The officer's weapon is 
drawn and leveled at the suspect. Meanwhile, the suspect reaches toward the hand-
gun, but instead of drawing it, succeeds in pushing it through his waistband where it 
promptly falls through to his ankle, and onto the ground. The officer observes the 
suspect give up his attempt to draw a weapon, just before the officer's trigger is 
pulled. The wheel spins to Controlling Force, and the suspect is given Voice Com-
mands at gunpoint, and is safely taken into custody. 
/d. This example captured the protean circumstances officers frequently face and the need to 
·act reasonably in light of the known, shifting circumstances. 
294 See supra notes 250-275 and accompanying text. 
295 See supra notes 210-233 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text. 
297 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
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B. APPLYING THE "SPECIAL NEEDs" DocTRINE: AFFORDING BRoAD 
DEFERENCE TO CoNTROL DISRUPTIVE STUDENTs AND 
ELIMINATING PHYSICAL PuNISHMENT 
In addition to the Court's balancing jurisprudence, one must con-
sider the "special needs" doctrine in determining what constitutes reason-
able force in the public schools. In synthesizing the schools' police-like 
responsibilities (i.e., to protect student safety) with their duty to educate, 
one may interpret the "special needs" doctrine under the Fourth Amend-
ment as permitting school officials to use physical force only when nec-
essary to control the educational environment. This limitation both 
furthers the schools' duty to educate and the students' Fourth Amend-
ment personal security interests. 
In New Jersey v. T.L.O. and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 
the Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness 
standard to public schools, as it examined, respectively, searches of an 
individual student and a group of athletes. In both situations, it distin-
guished between public school officials and police officers who search or 
seize individuals: public school officials are foremost educators, while 
police officers are criminal investigators. The Court measured reasona-
bleness in light of these contrasting goals, noting that educators are free 
to dispense with warrants, need not have probable cause to believe that a 
criminal violation occurred and, sometimes, do not even need reasonable 
suspicion to believe that a student violated school rules. Vernonia's 
four-part inquiry for assessing the reasonableness of suspicionless drug-
testing suggests a framework applicable, with minor revision, to the issue 
of physical force in the public schools. In determining whether the use 
of physical force violated a student's Fourth Amendment rights, courts 
should examine: (1) "the [personal security] interest upon which the 
[seizure] intrudes";298 (2) "the character of the intrusion that is com-
plained of';299 (3) "the nature and immediacy of the governmental con-
cern at issue"; and (4) "the efficacy of this means for meeting it."300 
Although the Court articulated these (now modified) distinct factors 
in Vernonia, a case involving searches without reasonable suspicion, 
these factors were nonetheless implicit in New Jersey v. T.L.O., a suspi-
cion-based search, and in the Court's policing jurisprudence in Tennessee 
v. Garner and Graham v. Connor. T.L. 0. raised specific questions re-
garding school-related seizures that easily fit under these modified fac-
tors: the seizure must be "reasonably related to the objective of the 
[seizure] and not excessively intrusive in light of the age ... of the 
298 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995). 
299 !d. at 658. 
300 /d. at 660. 
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student and the nature of the infraction."301 Similarly both Garner and 
Graham stated that reasonableness includes consideration of the offense 
committed, whether the individual poses an "immediate threat to the 
safety of the officers or others,"302 and whether the person resisted ap-
prehension. Vernonia referenced the "character of the intrusion," while 
in T.L.O., the Court asked whether the challenged search was "exces-
sively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of 
the infraction." Although T.L.O. added the adverb "excessively" toques-
tion the degree of intrusion, the sub-issues raised- age, sex, and offense 
committed- are a part of the Vernonia Court's third and fourth factors, 
the "nature and immediacy of the governmental concern and the efficacy 
of this means for meeting it." Therefore, both reasonableness tests com-
pare the degree of the intrusion with the need for it, as did the policing 
cases of Garner and Graham. 
Thus, though Vernonia, T.L.O., and Garner/Graham do differ doc-
trinally in minor ways, the reasoning of this line of cases also reflects 
overriding similarities, the dominant one being that each case defines 
reasonableness based upon balancing the individual's interest against the 
need to conduct the search or seizure. A synthesis of the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence in this area therefore supports applying a modified 
four-factor, Vernonia-type test when defining the contours of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness of physical force in the classroom. Apply-
ing this test indicates that school officials have broad discretion in using 
physical force to control students, but that they violate the Fourth 
Amendment when they use physical force to "punish" them. 
I. Students' Interest in Personal Security 
When students enter the public schools to fulfill their state's man-
date that they receive an education, they retain their interest in personal 
security safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment. The scope of this inter-
est, as the Court explained in examining students' privacy interests, re-
lates to the particular place they are - the public schools. 303 In 
assessing privacy interests, the Vernonia Court emphasized two contex-
tual factors: the students had "diminished" rights in comparison to 
301 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985). The Court also mentioned that the 
"sex of the student" was a factor in determining the reasonableness of a search. A search 
implicates strong privacy interests, as can a seizure, but in the context of school discipline, the 
sex of a student is not a factor in analyzing the reasonableness of public school officials using 
physical force to effectuate a "seizure." 
302 Graham, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
303 See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1380 (2000) (stating in dicta that safety 
concerns in the public schools diminish students' reasonable expectations of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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adults, and students are in the "temporary custody of the State as school 
master."304 
The first factor described the classic view of children having dimin-
ished rights in light of their age, and the second factor detailed the 
schools' custodial power and the duty to educate. Although the Court 
described these factors as "central"305 to its Fourth Amendment analysis 
of suspicionless drug-testing, when the issue involves the application of 
physical force to students, students may assert a significant interest in 
personal security, one even greater than their interest in the privacy of 
their belongings, which too merit Fourth Amendment protection. In 
describing this right to bodily integrity, the Court in Terry v. Ohio306 
described well that even the act of frisking a person - a search under the 
Fourth Amendment - seriously infringes an individual's interest in bod-
ily integrity: 
[I]t is simply fantastic to urge that [a frisk] performed in 
public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, 
perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty 
indignity." It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a 
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and it is not to be taken undertaken 
lightly.307 
Although the Court drew this conclusion as it examined police of-
ficers' dealing with adults on the streets, public school officials' acts of 
grabbing or hitting students are likely to evoke similar responses. The 
two contexts are even doctrinally linked because the Court in T.L.O. ap-
plied Terry's two-part inquiry to determine the reasonableness of search-
ing a particular student's purse. 
In the context of public schools, viewing students' interest in per-
sonal security is a complex issue because of compulsory education laws. 
When school teachers became "public" educators, a shift occurred. No 
longer were schools a place where teachers acted solely in loco parentis. 
School officials assumed a special duty to educate, one that at times was 
in conflict with parents' interests. School officials had "custody" of chil-
dren only to further their public duty to educate. 
When students thus entered public schools, the automatic linking of 
parents and teachers no longer applied. Even though parents historically 
have been able to use physical force to discipline children under both 
family privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and under relig-
304 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654. 
305 /d. 
306 392 u.s. 1 (1968). 
307 /d. at 16-17. 
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ious views protected by the First Amendment, public schools have 
neither of these interests to assert to justify physically punishing chil-
dren. They became a place for public education. 
In addition, modern society has increasingly viewed children with 
more and more distance .from their parents. The establishment of social 
service agencies has checked parents' interest in family privacy and in 
the exercise of religious beliefs. Simply, children are no longer the prop-
erty of parents; they are under the care of states, who educate them in the 
public schools and who monitor their safety at home as well. 
In short, public school students have a significant interest in per-
sonal security under the Fourth Amendment. 308 They are not like prison-
ers, with significantly diminished rights arising from convictions. 309 
They are temporarily in the custody of school officials to learn. Even 
though students have this significant interest in personal security, a deter-
mination of reasonableness also includes consideration of the three other 
Vernonia factors- the degree of intrusion, and the school's need to use 
physical force and the means used. 
2. Characterizing the Intrusion 
In characterizing the nature of the intrusion caused by the use of 
physical force, one must examine school officials' objective purpose in 
using force. Physical force used to control disruptive students (rather 
than to punish them) presents a lesser degree of intrusion upon a stu-
dent's personal security because the goal of the latter is to cause the 
student physical and psychological pain,3 10 while the former is used 
merely to diffuse a disruptive and potentially violent situation. Our soci-
ety has long recognized and accepted the use of physical force as a 
means of quelling and controlling the violence of others. Whether we 
think of police officers or citizens breaking up fights or schoolteachers 
controlling battling students, the use of physical force is often necessary 
to restore order and protect others from harm the disruptive individual 
might otherwise cause. In the context of the public schools, the use of 
force to control is a key function of public school officials' custodial 
powers as schools cannot accomplish their educational mission without 
308 Even the antiquated decision of Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,676 (1977), stated 
that a "child has a strong interest in procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful 
punishment." /d. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 147-184 and accompanying 
text. 
309 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985) (stating that "[w]e are not 
yet ready to hold that schools and the pnsons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment"). 
310 See Gaffney, supra note 254, at 2-3 (acknowledging the lack of consensus in defining 
"corporal punishment" but concluding that the different conceptualizations usually convey the 
idea of the purposeful and intentional administration of some degree of pain or discomfort). 
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effective physical control of their student population. In contrast to the 
use of physical force to punish, reformers have not sought to limit the use 
of physical force to regain control of disruption. Order, whether on the 
streets or in the public schools, has a place in our society, rooted both in 
common and modem law. Physical force used to regain and maintain 
order must therefore be characterized much differently than force used to 
punish and humiliate a student. 
The majority opinion of Ingraham v. Wright311 failed to compre-
hend the difference between physical force used as a method of control 
and force used to punish. In holding that no process was constitutionally 
required prior to striking students, the Ingraham Court assumed that hit-
ting a disruptive student was a form of both establishing control in the 
classroom and punishing the wrong-doer. However, the facts of the case 
clearly reveal that the beatings administered to the plaintiffs were in-
tended solely as punishment. The teachers involved had numerous op-
tions available to control the disruptive students other than striking 
them.312 And even if the teachers subjectively intended merely to con-
trol the students by striking them, the clear effect was one of punishment 
because the hitting occurred after the students ceased their disruption. 
The harm caused by the intrusion is another factor that must be con-
sidered when assessing the nature of the intrusion. Educational psychol-
ogists argue that children who are physically punished by authority 
figures may experience significant psychological harm as a result includ-
ing depression, dissociation, obsessive-compulsive tendencies, and re-
pressed anger and anxiety. 313 In contrast, physical force to control 
disruptive students does not engender the magnitude of these psychologi-
cal harms. 
3. The State's Interest: Physical Force to Control as a Means of 
Advancing Education 
To determine the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of striking a 
school student, one must also consider the government's interest in em-
ploying force. Included in this third inquiry, in light of the Vernonia, 
311 See supra notes 147-184 and accompanying text. 
312 Even when physical force does have the effect of immediately stopping disruptive 
behavior, it may still be constitutionally unreasonable. For example, in Young v. St. Landry 
Parish School Board, 759 So.2d 800, 802 (La. 1999), a schoolteacher allegedly "pulled" a 
student away from another student that he was bothering. The majority opinion stated that the 
teacher "did not intend to harm" the student, who ended up falling, later incurring almost 
$15,000 in medical expenses. !d. at 803. The majority held that the force was reasonable 
under state law, which allows teachers to use "reasonable force to maintain order in the class-
room or on school grounds." !d. at 804. The dissent, however, stated that the teacher used 
unreasonable force because better "alternative methods of discipline" existed. !d. at 805 (Thi-
bodeaux, J., dissenting). 
313 See supra notes 250-262 and accompanying text. 
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T.L.O., and Garner/Graham decisions, are the sub-issues of whether 
there was an "immediate" need for the force and the nature of the infrac-
tion committed. Under the "special needs" doctrine delineated in 
Vernonia, schools must have a "compelling interest" in order to use 
force, defined as one that "appears important enough to justify the partic-
ular search."314 The school's interest, therefore, needs simply to "out-
weigh" the student's interest. Without question, the state has an 
important interest in allowing its public school officials to use physical 
force in order to subdue disruptive students who interfere with the suc-
cessful functioning of the school. The state does not, however, have an 
important interest in physically punishing students because such acts 
"teach" students to be violent in solving problems. The authority that the 
state has relates to its state-law duty to educate. Therefore, the state's 
interest in striking students as punishment can never be a "compelling" 
one under the Vernonia test. 
The Vernonia decision similarly characterized the state's interest in 
light of the school's goal to educate students. The Court determined that 
the Vernonia school district had an "important enough" interest in requir-
ing drug-testing for school athletes because of the negative physical and 
psychological effects of drugs. The majority's reasoning thus linked the 
school's interest to its primary goal - education - and credited drug 
use with disrupting the "educational process."315 It also found an "im-
mediate" need for the testing because "[d]isciplinary actions had reached 
'epidemic proportions."'316 Thus, the Vernonia Court determined that 
the searches were constitutional, at least in part, because they were nec-
essary to control the school environment. In addition, Vernonia stressed 
that the results of the drug tests would not be turned over to the police, 
i.e., that the students would not be "punished" for their use of drugs. 317 
In short, the Vernonia Court approved of drug-testing designed to control 
the school environment but not to punish the students. 
4. The Efficacy of Physical Force in the Schools 
Determining the reasonableness of physical force also requires scru-
tiny of the means that officials used, specifically, the relationship be-
tween the force used and the infraction that precipitated it, and the 
efficacy of the force in a particular situation. Though school officials 
need not employ the "least intrusive" means of accomplishing their 
314 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995). 
315 /d. at 662. 
316 /d. at 663 (quoting the district court's conclusions). But cf id. at 684 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that that the record failed to establish a drug problem at the school). 
317 /d. at 658. 
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goals,3i 8 an assessment of Fourth Amendment reasonableness does re-
quire examination of the effects of the intrusion upon the student in light 
of the nature of the infraction committed and the urgency of the situation. 
Using physical force on a student, whether for the purpose of con-
trol or punishment, affects that student's physical and psychological 
well-being. When school officials administer force solely for the pur-
pose of controlling the student, the force is often proportionate to the 
level of resisting force being applied by the student and/or necessary to 
diffuse an emergent, violent situation. Just as police officers sometimes 
use unreasonable force in controlling suspects, public school officials 
may at times act unreasonably by using too much force in controlling 
students. Determining when school officials cross this line requires a 
case-by-case, objective analysis of the seriousness of the student's infrac-
tion, the intensity of the force used, the emergent circumstances of the 
situation, etc. 
By comparing the infraction with the need for force, one can discern 
the difference between physical force to control and physical force to 
punish. Distinguishing between these types of force do not, however, 
require determination of a school official's subjective intent. Just as the 
Court stated in Garner and Graham, reasonableness is an objective in-
quiry, measuring the reasonableness in light of the facts under considera-
tion. When public school officials use physical force to punish, they 
seek to change behavior by inflicting physical and psychological pain; 
when they use physical force to control it is because other alternatives 
will not stop the disruptive behavior. In short, physical force to punish is 
not a last resort technique to controlling a situation. School officials 
have a wide variety of other techniques to employ to stop this particular 
type of disruptive behavior. 
Thus, even though public school officials need not use the "least" 
intrusive means to accomplish their goal of educating students, eliminat-
ing physical punishment does not impose on them undue restrictions. 
They still have a significant number of alternative means to discipline 
disruptive students. For example, courts will not decide that school offi-
cials constitutionally erred in using a social discipline model as opposed 
to a positive discipline model.3 19 When public school officials use phys-
ical force to punish, they seek to change behavior by inflicting physical 
and psychological pain. When they use physical force to control it is 
because there are no other alternatives that will bring the disruptive be-
havior to an end. 
318 /d. 
319 For a discussion of the numerous disciplinary tools that public school officials may 
use, see supra notes 272-275 and accompanying text. 
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Therefore, while force used to control may sometimes be the only 
effective means to restore order, force used to punish is never effective 
because of the significant infringement of personal security and because 
it undermines the school's goal to educate. Although children may expe-
rience such discipline in their homes, there is a constitutional difference 
between parents inflicting this type of harm and public officials commit-
ting this act. The means must further the goal - even under T.L. 0. 's 
"reasonably related" test. Because students have such a significant inter-
est in personal security and because public school officials are foremost 
educators, they must not harm students when other means are easily 
available to further their important interest in education. Thus, physical 
punishment of school students does not survive scrutiny in light of the 
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment personal security jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION 
When children enter the public schools, they leave their parents be-
hind and experience a unique context, one controlled by state officials. 
At school, these officials have temporary custody of students to further 
their primary goal - education. To fulfill this goal, officials have used 
two different types of physical force: force to control disruptive, fighting 
students, and force used as punishment for violating school rules. Both 
types of physical force may implicate the Fourth Amendment because 
students have a right to be free from "unreasonable" seizures. Determin-
ing whether these seizures are constitutionally "reasonable" depends on 
how one balances the interests of the students and school officials. In 
light of the United States Supreme Court's modern Fourth Amendment 
personal security jurisprudence, school officials may act reasonably 
when using force to control disruptive students, but act unreasonably 
when they strike students to punish them. 
The difference between these two types of force appears when ex-
amining "reasonableness" in two related contexts: police officers' use of 
physical force during investigations and arrests, and public school offi-
cials' searches of students. In analyzing the physical force police of-
ficers used, the Court stated that reasonableness is an "objective 
standard," one that includes consideration of all the circumstances. One 
of those circumstances was technological advancement in weapons, 
which compelled the Court to reject the common-law practice of shoot-
ing all fleeing felons. In addition, the Court looked to modern policing 
practices to assess what was "reasonable." When the Court thus bal-
anced interests to determine reasonableness, it used modern policing 
views as an important factor. 
This balancing process also occurred in the Court's cases examining 
whether public school officials had conducted "reasonable" searches of 
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students. It articulated a four-part balancing standard: the student's inter-
est, the degree of intrusion on that interest, and the school's goals and 
means used to further those goals. 
When one similarly balances interests in the context of public 
school officials' use of physical force, how the balancing scales tip de-
pends on the objectives of the school officials. For example, when 
school officials use force to break-up students who are fighting, school 
officials resemble police officers (but with the goal of restoring an edu-
cational environment, not criminal prosecution). They need to act 
. quickly, not only for the benefit of those harming each other, but also for 
students near them. Like police officers, school officials "must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable [school official] on the 
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."320 The balance 
tips strongly in favor of school officials' use of force. 
In contrast, when public school officials use physical force to pun-
ish students, they act unreasonably. Ingraham v. Wright, decided in 
1977, failed to distinguish between these two types of physical force 
when it held that teachers do not need to give "pre-hitting" process to 
students before they strike them. The Court assumed that a quick hit was 
good psychologically for the student and constituted effective discipline. 
It also noted that modern (1970s) practice allowed this hitting in the pub-
lic schools. Since Ingraham, what the Court put in the balancing scales 
tips the other way. Numerous states have abandoned hitting in the public 
schools, and educational psychologists have declared that hitting does 
not teach self-discipline, nor does it create a sound educational atmos-
phere. In addition, the striking may cause students serious psychological 
damage. 
By interpreting the Fourth Amendment to ban public school offi-
cials from hitting students as a form of punishment, courts would further 
public schools' primary goal- creating a positive learning environment 
for our nation's youth. Under this view of reasonableness, public 
schools teach self-discipline and how to resolve conflict peacefully. 
320 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
